linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20070621211743.GN20105@marowsky-bree.de>
Date:	Thu, 21 Jun 2007 23:17:43 +0200
From:	Lars Marowsky-Bree <lmb@...e.de>
To:	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>, jjohansen@...e.de,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

On 2007-06-21T16:59:54, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:

> Or can access the data under a different path to which their profile
> does give them access, whether in its final destination or in some
> temporary file processed along the way.

Well, yes. That is intentional.

Your point is?

> The emphasis on never modifying applications for security in AA likewise
> has an adverse impact here, as you will ultimately have to deal with
> application mediation of access to their own objects and operations not
> directly visible to the kernel (as we have already done in SELinux for
> D-BUS and others and are doing for X).  Otherwise, your "protection" of
> desktop applications is easily subverted.

That is an interesting argument, but not what we're discussing here.
We're arguing filesystem access mediation.

> Um, no.  It might not be able to directly open files via that path, but
> showing that it can never read or write your mail is a rather different
> matter.

Yes. Your use case is different than mine.



Regards,
    Lars

-- 
Teamlead Kernel, SuSE Labs, Research and Development
SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG Nürnberg)
"Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes." -- Oscar Wilde

-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/