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Message-ID: <18043.46022.98869.640499@notabene.brown>
Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2007 21:34:30 +1000
From: Neil Brown <neilb@...e.de>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Lars Marowsky-Bree <lmb@...e.de>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>, jjohansen@...e.de,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,
pathname matching
On Friday June 22, sds@...ho.nsa.gov wrote:
> >
> > Yes. Your use case is different than mine.
>
> My use case is being able to protect data reliably. Yours?
Saying "protect data" is nearly meaningless without a threat model.
I bet you don't try to protect data from a direct nuclear hit, or a
court order.
AA has a fairly clear threat model. It involves a flaw in a
program being used by an external agent to cause it to use
privileges it would not normally exercise to subvert privacy or
integrity.
I think this model matches a lot of real threats that real sysadmins
have real concerns about. I believe that the design of AA addresses
this model quite well.
What is your threat model? Maybe it is just different.
NeilBrown
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