linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

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Message-ID: <467B45E0.3040207@manicmethod.com>
Date:	Thu, 21 Jun 2007 23:45:36 -0400
From:	Joshua Brindle <method@...icmethod.com>
To:	david@...g.hm
CC:	Lars Marowsky-Bree <lmb@...e.de>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>, jjohansen@...e.de,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,
 pathname matching

david@...g.hm wrote:
> On Thu, 21 Jun 2007, Joshua Brindle wrote:
>
>> Lars Marowsky-Bree wrote:
>>>  On 2007-06-21T16:59:54, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>>>  <snip>
>>>
>>>
>>> >  Um, no.  It might not be able to directly open files via that 
>>> path, but
>>> >  showing that it can never read or write your mail is a rather 
>>> different
>>> >  matter.
>>> >
>>>  Yes. Your use case is different than mine.
>>>
>>
>> So.. your use case is what? If an AA user asked you to protect his 
>> mail from his browser I'm sure you'd truthfully answer "no, we can't 
>> do that but we can protect the path to your mail from your browser".. 
>> I think not. One need only look at the wonderful marketing literature 
>> for AA to see what you are telling people it can do, and your above 
>> statement isn't consistent with that, sorry.
>
> remember, the policies define a white-list
>

Except for unconfined processes.

> so if a hacker wants to have mozilla access the mail files he needs to 
> get some other process on the sysstem to create a link or move a file 
> to a path that mozilla does have access to. until that is done there 
> is no way for mozilla to access the mail through the filesystem.
>
> other programs could be run that would give mozilla access to the mail 
> contents, but it would be through some other path that the policy 
> permitted mozilla accessing in the first place.
>
Or through IPC or the network, that is the point, filesystem only 
coverage doesn't cut it; there is no way to say the browser can't access 
the users mail in AA, and there never will be.

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