linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

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Date:	Sun, 24 Jun 2007 21:20:07 +0000 (UTC)
From:	daw@...berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,
 pathname matching

James Morris  wrote:
>The point is that the pathname model does not generalize, and that 
>AppArmor's inability to provide adequate coverage of the system is a 
>design issue arising from this.

I don't see it.  I don't see why you call this a design issue.  Isn't
this just a case where they haven't gotten around to implementing
network and IPC mediation yet?  How is that a design issue arising
from a pathname-based model?  For instance, one system I built (Janus)
provided complete mediation, including mediation of network and IPC,
yet it too used a pathname model for its policy file when describing
the policy for the filesystem.  That seems to contradict your statement.
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