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Message-ID: <20070626184048.GA12109@sergelap.austin.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2007 13:40:48 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>, Adrian Bunk <bunk@...sta.de>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Andrew Morgan <agm@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...gle.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH try #2] security: Convert LSM into a static interface
Quoting Greg KH (greg@...ah.com):
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 09:06:44AM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Adrian Bunk (bunk@...sta.de):
> > > On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 10:57:31PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > Quoting James Morris (jmorris@...ei.org):
> > > > > On Mon, 25 Jun 2007, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > It's useful for some LSMs to be modular, and LSMs which are y/n options won't
> > > > > > have any security architecture issues with unloading at all.
> > > > >
> > > > > Which LSMs? Upstream, there are SELinux and capabilty, and they're not
> > > > > safe as loadable modules.
> > > > >
> > > > > > The mere fact
> > > > > > that SELinux cannot be built as a module is a rather weak argument for
> > > > > > disabling LSM modules as a whole, so please don't.
> > > > >
> > > > > That's not the argument. Please review the thread.
> > > >
> > > > The argument is 'abuse', right?
> > > >
> > > > Abuse is defined as using the LSM hooks for non-security applications,
> > > > right?
> > > >
> > > > It seems to me that the community is doing a good job of discouraging
> > > > such abuse - by redirecting the "wrong-doers" to implement proper
> > > > upstream solutions, i.e. taskstats, the audit subsystem, etc.
> > > >
> > > > Such encouragement seems a far better response than taking away freedoms
> > > > and flexibility from everyone.
> > >
> > > We are not living in a world where everyone had good intentions...
> >
> > Oh no, i took a wrong turn somewhere :)
> >
> > > For _some_ "wrong-doers" your approach works.
> > >
> > > But how do you convince the "wrong-doers" who do things like putting
> > > MODULE_LICENSE("GPL") into their binary-only modules and who ignore you
> > > and get away because noone sues them?
> >
> > Do these really exist?
>
> Yes they do.
>
> > Maybe noone sues them because noone knows who they are...
>
> Maybe no one knows because the people doing the legal action against
> them are trying to be nice and do it quietly.
So they're being nice to the violaters, and then clamping down on
everyone...
> And legal action takes time, it is quite slow going unfortunatly.
>
> Heck, I've seen code that is even properly licensed under the GPL abuse
> this security layer for things it was not ment to do at all, and that
> stuff comes from _very_ big companies that really should know better...
But that's back to the other type of 'abuse' which i was originally
talking about, and which IMO is being well addressed through education.
As for the others, I have no better suggestions. I wish I did.
> So I agree that we should unexport it. It will make people who want to
> abuse the interface at least think twice about it.
And those who don't abuse it too.
> thanks,
>
> greg "I want to mark structures read-only" k-h
And I know I'm not the one who's going to stop you...
-serge
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