linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH try #2] security: Convert LSM into a static interface

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Message-ID: <20070627185125.GA17059@sergelap.austin.ibm.com>
Date:	Wed, 27 Jun 2007 13:51:25 -0500
From:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
Cc:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@....com>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
	Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morgan <agm@...gle.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...gle.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
	Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH try #2] security: Convert LSM into a static interface

Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (serue@...ibm.com):
> Quoting James Morris (jmorris@...ei.org):
> > On Wed, 27 Jun 2007, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > 
> > > Quoting Kyle Moffett (mrmacman_g4@....com):
> > > > This whole discussion boils down to 2 points:
> > > 
> > > Yes it can, but not the two you list.
> > > 
> > > >   1) As currently implemented, no LSM may be safely rmmod-ed
> > > 
> > > That's not the rationale for the patch, it's just some talking point you
> > > picked up.  The rationale for the patch is to prevent abuse.
> > 
> > This is not correct.  Reducing API abuse is simply a bonus.
> > 
> > The rationale for the patch is to remove unneeded infrastructure which 
> > complicates security by introducing the idea that the security module can 
> > be removed at all.
> > 
> > It was in response to your very own posting about the new capabilities 
> > code which would need to take this into account.
> 
> It's (IMO) by far not the optimal "solution"  :)  If it is felt a
> solution is really needed, re-introduction of a
> security_ops->module_exit hook and introduction of CAP_SYS_CAPDISABLE
> would be better.
> 
> But I'm well aware there are far too many (separate and not so separate)
> agendas driving this, and have no expectations of being able to stop it.
> 
> James, FWIW, I'm sorry I haven't had a chance to actually test the
> patch.  I'll try to get around to that today or at least this week.

Patch tests fine for me for expected capability behavior with lsm=n,
lsm=y, lsm=y+capability=y, lsm=y+selinux=y, and lsm=y+caps=y+selinux=y.

So while I'm opposed to the patch, it appears to be safe.

thanks,
-serge
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