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Message-ID: <46830FDE.7060502@ak.jp.nec.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2007 10:33:18 +0900
From: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...jp.nec.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
CC: Andrew Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
Andrew Morgan <agm@...gle.com>, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...gle.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...gai.gr.jp>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: introduce cap_setfcap
Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Here's the first patch (of several or many to come) to address some of
> Andrew's comments.
>
> Kaigai, IIUC cap_names.h will eventually be automatically updated? (I
> had to manually tweak it for testing as the new kernel sources were not
> located on the test system)
The origin of cap_names.h is "/usr/include/linux/capability.h".
Some scripts kicked by Makefile convert it, then cap_names.h will
be generated.
I don't know whether we can expect the kernel headers are always
deployed under "/usr/include/linux", or not.
In Fedora system, the kernel-headers package deploys all headers
there, so cap_names.h will eventually be automatically updated.
Thanks,
> thanks,
> -serge
>
>>>From fefcd341e478bd9e490d34abe9efd3c3c4f0b8a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
> Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2007 13:09:20 -0400
> Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: introduce cap_setfcap
>
> Setting file capabilities previously required the
> cap_sys_admin capability, since they are stored as
> extended attributes in the security.* namespace.
>
> Introduce CAP_SETFCAP (to mirror CAP_SETPCAP), and
> require it for setting file capabilities instead of
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
>
> Quoting Andrew Morgan,
>
> "CAP_SYS_ADMIN is way too overloaded and this
> functionality is special."
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
> ---
> include/linux/capability.h | 4 +++-
> security/commoncap.c | 12 ++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index 89125df..cdfaa10 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -324,7 +324,9 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
>
> #define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
>
> -#define CAP_NUMCAPS 31
> +#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
> +
> +#define CAP_NUMCAPS 32
>
> #ifdef __KERNEL__
> /*
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 4e9ff02..24de4fa 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -290,7 +290,11 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
> size_t size, int flags)
> {
> - if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> + if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
> + if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
> + return -EPERM;
> + return 0;
> + } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
> !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
> @@ -299,7 +303,11 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
>
> int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
> {
> - if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> + if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
> + if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
> + return -EPERM;
> + return 0;
> + } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
> !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
--
Open Source Software Promotion Center, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...jp.nec.com>
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