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Message-ID: <20070628181943.GG5339@ucw.cz>
Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2007 18:19:44 +0000
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: David Wagner <daw-usenet@...erner.cs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching
Hi!
One more...
> 2. This is argument #1 in a different guise and I find it about as weak.
> Pathname-based access control has strengths and weaknesses. I think
> users and Linux distributions are in a better position to evaluate those
> tradeoffs than L-K. Competition is good.
It took you quite a lot of time to realize AA does not do IPC (and all
the implications of that). I do not think Linux _users_ can do
informed decision here. Novell marketing did too good job here.
Heck, even I am not sure if I understand the implications of not doing
IPC confinement. Is shared memory commonly used in a way that allows
exploiting? I know it is a problem, and you probably could kill init
from hacked apache..... but what would you do to break out of jail?
Pavel
(please cc me)
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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