lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <200707202330.31644.rjw@sisk.pl>
Date:	Fri, 20 Jul 2007 23:30:30 +0200
From:	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>
To:	Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@....edu>
Cc:	Milton Miller <miltonm@....com>, Ying Huang <ying.huang@...el.com>,
	Alan Stern <stern@...land.harvard.edu>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, David Lang <david@...g.hm>,
	linux-pm <linux-pm@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [linux-pm] Re: Hibernation considerations

On Friday, 20 July 2007 19:31, Jeremy Maitin-Shepard wrote:
> Milton Miller <miltonm@....com> writes:
> 
> [snip]
> 
> >>>> (7) how to avoid corrupting filesystems mounted by the hibernated kernel
> >>> 
> >>> I didn't realize this was a discussion item. I thought the options were
> >>> clear, for some filesystem types you can mount them read-only, but for
> >>> ext3 (and possilby other less common ones) you just plain cannot touch
> >>> them.
> >> 
> >> That's correct.  And since you cannot thouch ext3, you need either to assume
> >> that you won't touch filesystems at all, or to have a code to recognize the
> >> filesystem you're dealing with.
> 
> > Or add a small bit of infrastructure that errors writes at make_request if you
> > don't have a magic "i am a direct block device write from userspace" flag on the
> > bio.
> 
> I still don't understand why there is this fixation on accessing dirty
> filesystems in use by the hibernated system.  Even if you avoid
> corrupting the filesystem by avoiding writing to the block device, there
> isn't any real guarantee about the state of the data, except for a
> filesystem that specifically makes guarantees about such data (and I
> don't believe any of the existing ones do).
> 
> It isn't necessary to be able to access such filesystems: everything can
> be done from an initramfs/initrd.

That's correct, but you need an additional ramdisk for that (yet another
complication).

Greetings,
Rafael


-- 
"Premature optimization is the root of all evil." - Donald Knuth
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ