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Message-ID: <9e0cf0bf0708122153q47a49e6ck5e80a8353172bd44@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2007 07:53:01 +0300
From: alon.barlev@...il.com
To: "Michael Chang" <thenewme91@...il.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <linux@...blig.org>,
"Pavel Machek" <pavel@....cz>, "Vojtech Pavlik" <vojtech@...e.cz>,
seife@...e.de, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Alan Stern" <stern@...land.harvard.edu>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@...el.com>,
"Jeremy Maitin-Shepard" <jbms@....edu>,
"Kyle Moffett" <mrmacman_g4@....com>,
"Nigel Cunningham" <nigel@...el.suspend2.net>,
"pm list" <linux-pm@...ts.linux-foundation.org>, david@...g.hm,
"Al Boldi" <a1426z@...ab.com>
Subject: Re: encrypted hibernation (was Re: Hibernation considerations)
Hello,
We already have a sample at:
http://wiki.tuxonice.net/EncryptedSwapAndRoot
It stores the keys of mounted partitions on an encrypted swap, which
has the same encryption with different keyset.
It also shows how to resume from encrypted swap, And you can
optionally store the keys on hardware device such as smartcards.
Best Regards,
Alon Bar-Lev
On 8/13/07, Michael Chang <thenewme91@...il.com> wrote:
> On 8/11/07, Dr. David Alan Gilbert <linux@...blig.org> wrote:
> > * Pavel Machek (pavel@....cz) wrote:
> > > Hi!
> > >
> > > > > > Two things which I think would be nice to consider are:
> > > > > > 1) Encryption - I'd actually prefer if my luks device did not
> > > > > > remember the key accross a hibernation; I want to be forced
> to
> > > > > > reenter the phrase. However I don't know what the best
> thing
> > > > > > to do to partitions/applications using the luks device is.
> > > > >
> > > > > Encryption is possible with both the userland hibernation (aka
> uswsusp) and
> > > > > TuxOnIce (formerly known as suspend2). Still, I don't consider it
> as a "must
> > > > > have" feature for a framework to be generally useful (many users
> don't use it
> > > > > anyway).
> > > >
> > > > If a user uses an encrypted filesystem, then he also needs an
> encrypted
> > > > swap and encrypted hibernation image: Otherwise the fileystem
> encryption
> > > > is not very useful.
> > >
> > > Actually, we can do most of that stuff already.
> > >
> > > We can encrypt filesystems, encrypt swaps (LVM), and encrypt
> hibernation.
> >
> > But can you do what my original question was; find a way to lose a luks
> > encrypted device key and cleanly unmount the filesystem that was
> > using it? (and preferably put it all back together after resume).
> >
>
> If you lose the device key, how are you going to get luks to find it
> again when resuming? Wouldn't it make more sense to have it remember
> the key? I can't see it being advisable to allow input or similar
> before resume has completed...
>
> --
> Michael Chang
>
> Please avoid sending me Word or PowerPoint attachments. Send me ODT,
> RTF, or HTML instead.
> See http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/no-word-attachments.html
> Thank you.
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