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Message-Id: <20070822155833.5142e588.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2007 15:58:33 -0700
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
Jakub Jelinek <jakub@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@...e.de>,
Kees Cook <kees@...flux.net>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] i386 and x86_64: randomize brk()
On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 18:05:01 +0200 (CEST)
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz> wrote:
> From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
>
> i386 and x86_64: randomize brk()
>
> This patch randomizes the location of the heap (brk) for i386 and x86_64.
> The range is randomized in the range starting at current brk location up
> to 0x02000000 offset on both architectures. This, together with
> pie-executable-randomization.patch and
> pie-executable-randomization-fix.patch, should make the address space
> randomization on i386 and x86_64 complete (modulo vDSO randomization).
>
> The code is based on execshield code written by Ingo Molnar.
My main concern right now is to try to stabilise the rc3-mm1 mess, so I
think I'll duck this for now.
> +#ifdef ARCH_HAS_RANDOMIZE_BRK
> + if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
> + arch_randomize_brk();
> +#endif
erk, please no.
It'd be better to put
static inline void arch_randomize_brk(void)
{
}
into all the other architecture's elf.h, then lose all the ifdefs.
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