linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] i386 and x86

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Date:	Mon, 3 Sep 2007 12:03:00 +0200 (CEST)
From:	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
To:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	Franck Bui-Huu <vagabon.xyz@...il.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] i386 and x86_64: randomize brk()

On Mon, 3 Sep 2007, Jiri Kosina wrote:

> the problem I am seeing with __weak functions is that as far as I can 
> see, gcc 4.1.0 optimizes the empty __weak function away with -O2, so it 
> is not later properly overridden by the other non-weak function, as the 
> callsite already doesn't have the corresponding call. (when I stick a 
> printk() into the __weak function, everything works fine - it is not 
> optimized away and non-weak version of the function gets called). I 
> persume this is a bug in gcc (4.1.1 doesn't seem to expose this 
> behavior). I will look at it a little bit more.

OK, the problem was crappy 4.1.1 gcc on my side (that has been a known bug 
and already fixed in later update). Updated patch below, thanks for your 
suggestions Franck.


From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>

i386 and x86_64: randomize brk()

This patch randomizes the location of the heap (brk) for i386 and x86_64. 
The range is randomized in the range starting at current brk location up 
to 0x02000000 offset for both architectures. This, together with 
pie-executable-randomization.patch and 
pie-executable-randomization-fix.patch, should make the address space 
randomization on i386 and x86_64 complete.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>

diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c b/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
index 8466471..fb3d407 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
@@ -949,3 +949,17 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
 		sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
 	return sp & ~0xf;
 }
+
+void arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	unsigned long new_brk;
+	unsigned long range_start;
+	unsigned long range_end;
+
+	range_start = mm->brk;
+	range_end = range_start + 0x02000000;
+	new_brk = randomize_range(range_start, range_end, 0);
+	if (new_brk)
+		mm->brk = mm->start_brk = new_brk;
+}
+
diff --git a/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c
index 2842f50..de40057 100644
--- a/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c
@@ -902,3 +902,17 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
 		sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
 	return sp & ~0xf;
 }
+
+void arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	unsigned long new_brk;
+	unsigned long range_start;
+	unsigned long range_end;
+
+	range_start = mm->brk;
+	range_end = range_start + 0x02000000;
+	new_brk = randomize_range(range_start, range_end, 0);
+	if (new_brk)
+		mm->brk = mm->start_brk = new_brk;
+}
+
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index d65f1d9..4bf0ca1 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs);
 static int load_elf_library(struct file *);
 static unsigned long elf_map (struct file *, unsigned long, struct elf_phdr *, int, int, unsigned long);
 
+/* overriden by architectures supporting brk randomization */
+void __weak arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
+
 /*
  * If we don't support core dumping, then supply a NULL so we
  * don't even try.
@@ -1073,6 +1076,9 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	current->mm->end_data = end_data;
 	current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p;
 
+	if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
+		arch_randomize_brk(current->mm);
+
 	if (current->personality & MMAP_PAGE_ZERO) {
 		/* Why this, you ask???  Well SVr4 maps page 0 as read-only,
 		   and some applications "depend" upon this behavior.

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