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Message-ID: <20071004235600.A4177@mrwint.cisco.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2007 23:56:00 +0100
From: Derek Fawcus <dfawcus@...co.com>
To: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Version 3 (2.6.23-rc8) Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
On Wed, Oct 03, 2007 at 01:12:46AM +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
>
> The value of SELinux (or indeed any system compartmentalising access and
> limiting damage) comes into play when you get breakage - eg via a web
> browser exploit.
well, being sick of the number of times one has to upgrade the browser
for exploits, I addressed it in a different way.
I ran firefox setuid to a different (not my main user), uid+gid, gave
my main account that gid as a supplemental group, and gave that uid
access to the X magic cookie.
... which only changes the nature of any exploit that might occur - any
injected code would have to go via X to attack my main account.
DF
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