linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] Version 3 (2.6.23-rc8) Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel

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Message-ID: <20071008222058.208c6f32@the-village.bc.nu>
Date:	Mon, 8 Oct 2007 22:20:58 +0100
From:	Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To:	ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
Cc:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@....com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Bill Davidsen <davidsen@....com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	casey@...aufler-ca.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Version 3 (2.6.23-rc8) Smack: Simplified Mandatory
 Access Control Kernel

> My very practical question:  How do I run selinux in one container,
> and SMACK in another?

In the LSM model you don't because you could have the same container
objects visible in different contains at the same time and subject to
different LSMs. What does it mean to pass an SELinux protected object
over an AppArmour protected unix domain socket into a SMACK protected
container ?

If you want consistency then you probably need to put the container id
into the LSM calls and provide the ability in one system to do container
specific checks. Right now I suspect the way to do it is to complete the
work to convert SMACK rulesets into SELinux rulesets with tools.

Really its the same problem as "I'd like to use different file permission
systems on different process identifiers" and it would be very hard to
get right simply because objects can pass between two different security
models.

Pyramid tried to do the "simple" case of BSD and System 5 on the same box
and got caught out even with that because of the different rules on stuff
like chgrp..
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