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Message-ID: <5541.1193307789@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2007 06:23:09 -0400
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...putergmbh.de>,
Giacomo Catenazzi <cate@...ian.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
Thomas Fricaccia <thomas_fricacci@...oo.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Subject: Re: LSM conversion to static interface
On Tue, 23 Oct 2007 10:34:09 CDT, "Serge E. Hallyn" said:
> And he will still be able to *run* the suid binary, but if cap_bound is
> reduced he won't be able to use capabilities taken out of the bounding
> set, multiadm loaded or not.
I am willing to bet that there's still a *lot* of unaudited set[ug]id code
out there that's vulnerable to the same sorts of attacks as the one that
hit Sendmail a few back. As such, I have to agree with your original
post of the patch that CAP_SYS_ADMIN should be required to lower the set,
as there's just too much danger of an exploit if users can create their
own reduced-set processes.
I'm debating whether we should have a printk if we detect that a removed
capability caused an -EPERM. Yes, it can be used to spam the logs. On the
other hand, I as the sysadmin would like to know if it's happening. Looks like
time for a sysctl or something....
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