Date:	Thu, 25 Oct 2007 20:45:31 -0700 (PDT)
From:	david@...g.hm
To:	Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
cc:	Ray Lee <ray-lk@...rabbit.org>, Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	Adrian Bunk <bunk@...nel.org>,
	Simon Arlott <simon@...e.lp0.eu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...putergmbh.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
	Thomas Fricaccia <thomas_fricacci@...oo.com>,
	Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Crispin Cowan <crispin@...spincowan.com>,
	Giacomo Catenazzi <cate@...ian.org>
Subject: Re: Linux Security *Module* Framework (Was: LSM conversion to static
 interface)

On Thu, 25 Oct 2007, Alan Cox wrote:

>>> There is a ton of evidence both in computing and outside of it which
>>> shows that poor security can be very much worse than no security at all.
>>
>> (So, I take it that you *don't* lock your bike up, as poor security is
>> worse than none?)
>
> On the contrary because I know it is not secure I would
>
> a) Insure it

and the unsurance company would have a clause in the policy that wouldn't 
cover you unless you used a lock, becouse they recognise that while it 
wouldn't stop everyone there is a large group of potential thieves that it 
would stop.

> b) Not waste vast amounts of money on a useless expensive lock

who said the lock was expensive? and while you are not willing to spend 
money on a lock you are willing to spend (much more) money on an insurance 
policy.

David Lang

> c) Make sure the bike looked not worth stealing
> d) Take the saddle with me
>
> (or the software versions of that
>
> a) Keep backups
> b) Not waste vast amounts of money on bogus security software
> c) Keep the system looking uninteresting
> d) Encrypt the data)
>
>> 'Inappropriate risks' nowadays is surfing the web and opening up mail
>> attachments that claim to be movies of dancing bears. I'd argue that
>> users have a reasonable expectation that these are things that should
>> 'just work,' and be safe, much as normal humans have an expectation
>> that their car isn't going to explode when they turn the ignition.
>
> Yes and its very clear from the things said by politicians that if the
> computer software people don't do this soon, the legislators will make
> very sure they do by stripping away all the techniques used to hide from
> liability for failure.
>
>> Perfect is the enemy of good, or words to that effect, right? My point
>> is that requiring perfection out of a security framework is a bar
>> that's going to be awfully difficult to reach (and when it supposedly
>> has been achieved, as in SELinux, mere mortals find it too troublesome
>> to run with as it's far too difficult to configure). Security can and
>> should be done in layers, and what one may miss, another may catch.
>
> Absolutely - but those layers should do whatever they do *right* and
> really do it, whether they are complex whole system controls like SELinux
> or simple network security tools.
>
> Alan
> -
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