linux-kernel - Re: Linux Security *Module* Framework (Was: LSM conversion to static interface)

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Message-ID: <20071028221214.171f7d3a@laptopd505.fenrus.org>
Date:	Sun, 28 Oct 2007 22:12:14 -0700
From:	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>
To:	Crispin Cowan <crispin@...spincowan.com>
Cc:	Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Ray Lee <ray-lk@...rabbit.org>,
	Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	Adrian Bunk <bunk@...nel.org>,
	Simon Arlott <simon@...e.lp0.eu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...putergmbh.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
	Thomas Fricaccia <thomas_fricacci@...oo.com>,
	Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Giacomo Catenazzi <cate@...ian.org>
Subject: Re: Linux Security *Module* Framework (Was: LSM conversion to
 static interface)

On Sun, 28 Oct 2007 15:08:56 -0700
Crispin Cowan <crispin@...spincowan.com> wrote:

> To reject an LSM for providing "bad" security, IMHO you should have to
> show how it is possible to subvert the self-stated goals of that LSM.
> Complaints that the LSM fails to meet some goal outside of its stated
> purpose is irrelevant. Conjecture that it probably can be violated
> because of $contrivance is just so much FUD.

exactly; this is why I've been pushing recently for each new LSM to at
least document and make explicit what it tries to protect / protect
against (threat model and defense model in traditional security terms).
Without such an explicit description it's both impossible to
"neutrally" review a proposed LSM towards its goals, and it ends up as
a result with people making assumptions and attacking the model because
there's no separation between code and model.

 
> Exception: it is valid to say that the self-stated goal is too narrow
> to be useful. But IMHO that bar of "too narrow" should be very, very
> low. Defenses against specific modes of attack would be a fine thing
> to build up in the library of LSMs, especially if we got a decent
> stacking module so that they could be composed.

again I agree pretty much; I do want to reserve some minimum "common
sense" bar because people may (and probably will) do silly things withs
LSMs that are really not the right thing to do objectively.


-- 
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