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Message-ID: <4726D9D9.2000909@ii.net> Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2007 15:14:33 +0800 From: Cliffe <cliffe@...net> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org Subject: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface Defense in depth has long been recognised as an important secure design principle. Security is best achieved using a layered approach. On a single system it makes sense to have a layered approach such as: Standard DAC (where users are in control of permissions) Some form of user-based non-DAC (where admins can specify what users can specifically do) such as SELinux or SMACK System-wide firewall (netfilter) Some form of sandboxes/namespace isolation (chroot, jails...) General application confinement such as DTE (SELinux), or Capability lists (AppArmor, systrace ...) Application network confinement - firewall to confine individual apps (maybe included in the above) IDS or IPS Malware scanner Posix Capabilities Pax/RaceGuard ...[insert innovation here]... And while I acknowledge that many of these layers are currently buried within the kernel (netfilter...) they are security layers which in many cases would probably make sense as stackable security modules. Making the interface static forces mammoth solutions which then must attempt to solve all of the above in one ls*m*. What happened to dividing tasks into easy to manage chunks? Regards, Z. Cliffe Schreuders BSc Comp Sci (Hons) & Int Comp PhD Candidate, Casual Tutor School of IT Murdoch University - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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