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Message-ID: <20071110225755.5dd9b52b@the-village.bc.nu>
Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2007 22:57:55 +0000
From: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Crispin Cowan <crispin@...spincowan.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <linux@...blig.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM ML <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
apparmor-dev <apparmor-dev@...ge.novell.com>
Subject: Re: AppArmor Security Goal
> Can you explain why you want a non-privileged user to be able to edit
> policy? I would like to better understand the problem here.
Because root doesn't trust users who in turn may not trust apps they run
or wish to control things. I don't see a problem with that viewpoint in
terms of forbidding things providing the user (or process tree) does not
get to undo rules merely add more restrictions.
> non-privileged user to further tighten the profile on a program. To me,
> that adds complexity with not much value, but if lots of users want it,
> then I'm wrong :)
Assuming you have any value in the first place, which is another topic, I
can see value for this in all the security models.
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