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Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2007 19:55:12 -0800
From: John Johansen <jjohansen@...e.de>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: Crispin Cowan <crispin@...spincowan.com>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <linux@...blig.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM ML <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
apparmor-dev <apparmor-dev@...ge.novell.com>
Subject: Re: AppArmor Security Goal
On Sat, Nov 10, 2007 at 06:17:30PM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
> --- Crispin Cowan <crispin@...spincowan.com> wrote:
>
> > Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > ...
> >
> > Can you explain why you want a non-privileged user to be able to edit
> > policy? I would like to better understand the problem here.
> >
> > Note that John Johansen is also interested in allowing non-privileged
> > users to manipulate AppArmor policy, but his view was to only allow a
> > non-privileged user to further tighten the profile on a program. To me,
> > that adds complexity with not much value, but if lots of users want it,
> > then I'm wrong :)
>
> Now this is getting interesting. It looks to me as if you've implemented
> a mandatory access control scheme that some people would like to be able
> to use as a discretionary access control scheme. This is creepy after
> seeing the MCS implementation in SELinux, which is also a DAC scheme
> wacked out of a MAC scheme. Very interesting indeed.
>
hehe perhaps. There are lots of issues involved with doing something
like this and there are more important issues to address first.
I also don't see it so much of a DAC scheme as a user defining a MAC
for their own processes they don't trust. An application so confined
would not have the ability to change its confinement.
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