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Message-ID: <Xine.LNX.4.64.0711170856200.22208@us.intercode.com.au>
Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2007 08:58:01 +1100 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, sds@...ho.nsa.gov,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, alan@...hat.com, chrisw@...hat.com,
hpa@...or.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low
vm space
On Fri, 16 Nov 2007, Eric Paris wrote:
> On Sat, 2007-11-17 at 08:47 +1100, James Morris wrote:
> > On Fri, 16 Nov 2007, Eric Paris wrote:
> >
> > > On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements
> > > security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses
> > > lower than mmap_min_addr.
> >
> > Actually, should we be doing any checking in the dummy module, given that
> > it is not done with !CONFIG_SECURITY ?
>
> I'm not sure I understand the question. We already do a number of
> capable type security checks in dummy functions. See dummy_settime() as
> just one example.
I mean just in this case. If no mmap_min_addr check is done without
CONFIG_SECURITY, then perhaps none should be done in the dummy module,
i.e. preserving existing behavior. LSM is theoretically supposed to be
unnoticable from a behavioral pov unless a non-dummy module is loaded.
>
> If we have !CONFIG_SECURITY we don't have any security protections (how
> could we? we turned them off) so we don't get into dummy hooks. If we
> do checks or not in uncompiled code doesn't seem to me to matter.
>
> Maybe I'm just confused...
>
> -Eric
>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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