linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 3/3] security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm space

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Message-ID: <Xine.LNX.4.64.0711170911140.31014@us.intercode.com.au>
Date:	Sat, 17 Nov 2007 09:12:13 +1100 (EST)
From:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To:	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, sds@...ho.nsa.gov,
	selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, alan@...hat.com, chrisw@...hat.com,
	hpa@...or.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low
 vm space

On Fri, 16 Nov 2007, Eric Paris wrote:

> When this protection was originally concieved it intentionally was
> offing something even without an more 'full featured' LSM.  That was the
> whole reason I had to drop the secondary stacking hook inside the
> selinux code.
> 
> While I now understand the question, I think that this is the behavior
> most people would want.  I'll revert the security enhancement for
> non-LSM systems if others agree with James, but I think adding another
> small bit of protection against kernel flaws for everyone who wants
> security is a win.  (and remember, in kernel we still default this to
> off so noone is going to 'accidentally' see and security checks in the
> dummy hooks)

If it's off by default and generally useful across LSMs, why not just put 
it in the base kernel code?


- James
-- 
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
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