| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2007 09:12:13 +1100 (EST) From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> To: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com> cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, sds@...ho.nsa.gov, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, alan@...hat.com, chrisw@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm space On Fri, 16 Nov 2007, Eric Paris wrote: > When this protection was originally concieved it intentionally was > offing something even without an more 'full featured' LSM. That was the > whole reason I had to drop the secondary stacking hook inside the > selinux code. > > While I now understand the question, I think that this is the behavior > most people would want. I'll revert the security enhancement for > non-LSM systems if others agree with James, but I think adding another > small bit of protection against kernel flaws for everyone who wants > security is a win. (and remember, in kernel we still default this to > off so noone is going to 'accidentally' see and security checks in the > dummy hooks) If it's off by default and generally useful across LSMs, why not just put it in the base kernel code? - James -- James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists