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Message-Id: <20071119221559.2f4bdb26.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 22:15:59 -0800
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Helge Deller <deller@....de>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Time-based RFC 4122 UUID generator
On Sun, 18 Nov 2007 20:38:21 +0100 Helge Deller <deller@....de> wrote:
> Andrew,
>
> could you please consider adding this patch to your 2.6.25 patch series?
please cc netdev on networking-related things
> This is the third version of the patch in which I cleaned up and fixed quite some stuff according to feedback from Ted.
> I assume this version is OK, since I didn't received any further feedback since two weeks: http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/11/4/128.
>
> Thanks,
> Helge
> -------
> Title: Add time-based RFC 4122 UUID generator
>
> The current Linux kernel currently contains the generate_random_uuid()
> function, which creates - based on RFC 4122 - truly random UUIDs and
> provides them to userspace through /proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id and
> /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid.
>
> This patch additionally adds the "Time-based UUID" variant of RFC 4122,
> with which userspace applications can easily get real unique time-based
> UUIDs through /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid_time.
> A new /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid_time_clockseq sysfs entry is available,
> so that the clock_seq value can be retained across system bootups (which
> is required by RFC 4122).
>
> The attached implementation uses getnstimeofday() to get very fine-grained
> granularity. This helps, so that userspace tools can get a lot more UUIDs
> (if needed) per time than before.
> A mutex takes care of the proper locking against a mistaken double creation
> of UUIDs for simultanious running processes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@....de>
>
> drivers/char/random.c | 205 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> include/linux/sysctl.h | 5 -
> 2 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index 5fee056..fc48c29 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
> * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All
> * rights reserved.
> *
> + * Time based UUID (RFC 4122) generator:
> + * Copyright Helge Deller <deller@....de>, 2007
> + *
> * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
> * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
> * are met:
> @@ -239,6 +242,7 @@
> #include <linux/spinlock.h>
> #include <linux/percpu.h>
> #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
> +#include <linux/if_arp.h>
>
> #include <asm/processor.h>
> #include <asm/uaccess.h>
> @@ -1174,12 +1178,169 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(generate_random_uuid);
> static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;
> static int max_read_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
> static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
> -static char sysctl_bootid[16];
> +static unsigned char sysctl_bootid[16] __read_mostly;
>
> /*
> - * These functions is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
> - * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
> - * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
> + * Helper functions and variables for time based UUID generator
> + */
> +static unsigned int clock_seq;
> +static const unsigned int clock_seq_max = 0x3fff; /* 14 bits */
There isn't a lot of point in `static const'. Hopefully the compiler will
do the right thing with it (use literal constant and elide the storage if
nothing takes its address) but why not just do #define UPPER_CASE_THING in
the time-homoured manner?
> +static int clock_seq_initialized __read_mostly;
> +
> +static void init_clockseq(void)
> +{
> + get_random_bytes(&clock_seq, sizeof(clock_seq));
> + clock_seq &= clock_seq_max;
> + clock_seq_initialized = 1;
> +}
> +
> +static int proc_dointvec_clockseq(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> + struct file *filp, void __user *buffer,
> + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!write && !clock_seq_initialized)
> + init_clockseq();
Seems there's a straightfroward race here where multiple tasks can run
init_clockseq() concurrently.
Can't we use a regular initcall here and make init_clockseq() __init? I
guess that would cast doubt over the quality of the thing which
get_random_bytes() returned, but that's already the case - super-early
userspace in initramfs could mount /proc and trigger this call. We end up
with a predictable sequence number?
> + ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos);
> +
> + if (write && ret >= 0) {
> + clock_seq_initialized = 1;
> + clock_seq &= clock_seq_max;
> + }
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Generate time based UUID (RFC 4122)
> + *
> + * This function is protected with a mutex to ensure system-wide
> + * uniqiness of the new time based UUID.
> + */
> +static void generate_random_uuid_time(unsigned char uuid_out[16])
> +{
> + static DEFINE_MUTEX(uuid_mutex);
> + static u64 last_time_all;
> + static unsigned int clock_seq_started;
> + static unsigned char last_mac[ETH_ALEN];
> +
> + struct timespec ts;
> + u64 time_all;
> + unsigned char *found_mac = NULL;
> + struct net_device *d __maybe_unused;
> + int inc_clock_seq = 0;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&uuid_mutex);
> +
> + /* Get the spatially unique node identifier */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_NET
> + read_lock(&dev_base_lock);
> + for_each_netdev(&init_net, d) {
> + if (d->type == ARPHRD_ETHER && d->addr_len == ETH_ALEN
> + && d != init_net.loopback_dev) {
> + if (!memcmp(&last_mac, d->dev_addr, ETH_ALEN)) {
> + found_mac = last_mac;
> + break;
> + }
> + if (!found_mac)
> + found_mac = d->dev_addr;
> + }
> + }
> + if (found_mac)
> + memcpy(&uuid_out[10], found_mac, ETH_ALEN);
> + read_unlock(&dev_base_lock);
> +#endif
hm. Maybe that should be a helper function over in net/, dunno.
So you're assuming that the first-encountered netdev's mac address is a
globally-unique number? That's a key design decision and should 100%
have appeared front-and-centre in the changelog.
Is it true? It may be true in a practial sense, but perhaps in some
private networking environments some organisations have duplicated mac
addresses?
What are the implications of this assumption being false?
> + if (unlikely(!found_mac)) {
> + /* use bootid's nodeID if no network interface found */
> + if (sysctl_bootid[8] == 0)
> + generate_random_uuid(sysctl_bootid);
> + memcpy(&uuid_out[10], &sysctl_bootid[10], ETH_ALEN);
> + }
What is "bootid's nodeID"?
I guess I could work it out, but again, this is a core design decision and
it should be properly covered in your changelog so we can
understand what your thinking is here.
> + /* if MAC/NodeID changed, create a new clock_seq value */
> + if (unlikely(found_mac != last_mac &&
> + memcmp(&last_mac, &uuid_out[10], ETH_ALEN))) {
> + memcpy(&last_mac, &uuid_out[10], ETH_ALEN);
> + inc_clock_seq = 1;
> + }
etc.
> + /* Determine 60-bit timestamp value. For UUID version 1, this is
> + * represented by Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) as a count of 100-
> + * nanosecond intervals since 00:00:00.00, 15 October 1582 (the date of
> + * Gregorian reform to the Christian calendar).
> + */
> +advance_time:
> + getnstimeofday(&ts);
> + time_all = ((u64) ts.tv_sec) * (NSEC_PER_SEC/100);
> + time_all += ts.tv_nsec / 100;
> +
> + /* add offset from Gregorian Calendar to Jan 1 1970 */
> + time_all += 12219292800000ULL * (NSEC_PER_MSEC/100);
> + time_all &= 0x0fffffffffffffffULL; /* limit to 60 bits */
> +
> + /* Determine clock sequence (max. 14 bit) */
> + if (unlikely(!clock_seq_initialized)) {
> + init_clockseq();
> + clock_seq_started = clock_seq;
> + } else {
> + if (unlikely(inc_clock_seq || time_all <= last_time_all)) {
> + clock_seq = (clock_seq+1) & clock_seq_max;
> + if (unlikely(clock_seq == clock_seq_started)) {
> + clock_seq = (clock_seq-1) & clock_seq_max;
> + goto advance_time;
> + }
> + } else
> + clock_seq_started = clock_seq;
> + }
> + last_time_all = time_all;
> +
> + /* Fill in timestamp and clock_seq values */
> + uuid_out[3] = (u8) time_all;
> + uuid_out[2] = (u8) (time_all >> 8);
> + uuid_out[1] = (u8) (time_all >> 16);
> + uuid_out[0] = (u8) (time_all >> 24);
> + uuid_out[5] = (u8) (time_all >> 32);
> + uuid_out[4] = (u8) (time_all >> 40);
> + uuid_out[7] = (u8) (time_all >> 48);
> + uuid_out[6] = (u8) (time_all >> 56);
> +
> + uuid_out[8] = clock_seq >> 8;
> + uuid_out[9] = clock_seq & 0xff;
> +
> + /* Set UUID version to 1 --- time-based generation */
> + uuid_out[6] = (uuid_out[6] & 0x0F) | 0x10;
> + /* Set the UUID variant to DCE */
> + uuid_out[8] = (uuid_out[8] & 0x3F) | 0x80;
> +
> + mutex_unlock(&uuid_mutex);
> +}
> +
> +
> +/*
> + * Get UUID based on requested type.
> + */
> +static unsigned char *get_uuid(void *extra1, unsigned char *uuid)
> +{
> + switch ((int) extra1) {
> + case RANDOM_BOOT_ID:
> + uuid = sysctl_bootid;
> + if (unlikely(uuid[8] == 0))
> + generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> + break;
> + case RANDOM_UUID:
> + generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> + break;
> + case RANDOM_UUID_TIME:
> + generate_random_uuid_time(uuid);
> + break;
> + }
> + return uuid;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * These functions are used to return the bootid UUID, random UUID and
> + * time based UUID.
> *
> * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, it will be returned
> * as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format. If accesses via the
> @@ -1191,13 +1352,13 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
> ctl_table fake_table;
> unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
>
> - uuid = table->data;
> - if (!uuid) {
> - uuid = tmp_uuid;
> - uuid[8] = 0;
> + /* random/time UUIDs need to be read completely at once */
> + if ((int)table->extra1 != RANDOM_BOOT_ID && *ppos > 0) {
> + *lenp = 0;
> + return 0;
> }
> - if (uuid[8] == 0)
> - generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> +
> + uuid = get_uuid(table->extra1, tmp_uuid);
>
> sprintf(buf, "%02x%02x%02x%02x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x-"
> "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
> @@ -1221,13 +1382,7 @@ static int uuid_strategy(ctl_table *table, int __user *name, int nlen,
> if (!oldval || !oldlenp)
> return 1;
>
> - uuid = table->data;
> - if (!uuid) {
> - uuid = tmp_uuid;
> - uuid[8] = 0;
> - }
> - if (uuid[8] == 0)
> - generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> + uuid = get_uuid(table->extra1, tmp_uuid);
>
> if (get_user(len, oldlenp))
> return -EFAULT;
> @@ -1284,11 +1439,11 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
> {
> .ctl_name = RANDOM_BOOT_ID,
> .procname = "boot_id",
> - .data = &sysctl_bootid,
> .maxlen = 16,
> .mode = 0444,
> .proc_handler = &proc_do_uuid,
> .strategy = &uuid_strategy,
> + .extra1 = (void *) RANDOM_BOOT_ID,
> },
> {
> .ctl_name = RANDOM_UUID,
> @@ -1297,6 +1452,20 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
> .mode = 0444,
> .proc_handler = &proc_do_uuid,
> .strategy = &uuid_strategy,
> + .extra1 = (void *) RANDOM_UUID,
> + },
> + {
> + .procname = "uuid_time",
> + .mode = 0444,
> + .proc_handler = &proc_do_uuid,
> + .extra1 = (void *) RANDOM_UUID_TIME,
> + },
> + {
> + .procname = "uuid_time_clockseq",
> + .data = &clock_seq,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
> + .mode = 0644,
> + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_clockseq,
> },
> { .ctl_name = 0 }
> };
> diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
> index e99171f..dd09d97 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
> @@ -248,8 +248,9 @@ enum
> RANDOM_ENTROPY_COUNT=2,
> RANDOM_READ_THRESH=3,
> RANDOM_WRITE_THRESH=4,
> - RANDOM_BOOT_ID=5,
> - RANDOM_UUID=6
> + RANDOM_BOOT_ID=5, /* rfc4122 version 4, boot UUID */
> + RANDOM_UUID=6, /* rfc4122 version 4, random-based */
> + RANDOM_UUID_TIME=7 /* rfc4122 version 1, time-based */
> };
-
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