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Message-Id: <1196120866.16779.16.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 18:47:46 -0500
From: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@...ei.org, sds@...ho.nsa.gov, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
alan@...hat.com, chrisw@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/3-v2] security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low
vm space
On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements
security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses
lower than mmap_min_addr. Based on a suggestion from a developer in the
openwall community this patch adds a check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO. It is
assumed that any process with this capability can harm the system a lot
more easily than writing some stuff on the zero page and then trying to
get the kernel to trip over itself. It also means that programs like X
on i686 which use vm86 emulation can work even with mmap_min_addr set.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
---
security/dummy.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 6d895ad..3ccfbbe 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int dummy_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long addr_only)
{
- if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+ if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EACCES;
return 0;
}
-
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