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Message-Id: <20071127131632.808bf9f8.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2007 13:16:32 -0800
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: casey@...aufler-ca.com
Cc: torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, morgan@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] -mm (2.4.26-rc3-mm1) v2 Smack using capabilities 32
and 33
On Mon, 26 Nov 2007 12:38:56 -0800
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
> From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
>
> This patch takes advantage of the increase in capability bits
> to allocate capabilities for Mandatory Access Control. Whereas
> Smack was overloading a previously allocated capability it is
> now using a pair, one for overriding access control checks and
> the other for changes to the MAC configuration.
>
> The two capabilities allocated should be obvious in their intent.
> The comments in capability.h are intended to make it clear that
> there is no intention that implementations of MAC LSM modules
> be any more constrained by the presence of these capabilities
> than an implementation of DAC LSM modules are by the analogous
> DAC capabilities.
>
>
> + !__capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> + !__capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
Is there any reason for not using plain old capable() here?
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