linux-kernel - Re: Out of tree module using LSM

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Message-ID: <25290.1196273705@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date:	Wed, 28 Nov 2007 13:15:05 -0500
From:	Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To:	Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Cc:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	"Tvrtko A. Ursulin" <tvrtko.ursulin@...hos.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Out of tree module using LSM

On Wed, 28 Nov 2007 16:46:13 GMT, Christoph Hellwig said:
> On Wed, Nov 28, 2007 at 08:38:43AM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Would you like to expound on that, or do you feel your claws
> > are sharp enough already?
> 
> Just take a look at code.

Just to clarify - you're OK with the *concept* (a security model that determines
whether you can do an I/O based on the content), it's just their code that's
ugly?

(Note that the concept has interesting implications in the other direction as
well - rather than stopping you from reading a file that has malware, you could
in theory write an anti-export package that would let you write onto external
memory or outbound e-mail, but prevent the write if it was corporate-sensitive
data, or whatever.  Yes, I *know* a smart attacker can bypass it by simply
crypting/compressing it first - but the vast majority of attackers aren't
smart, and will just use 'cp' or the GUI equivalent to move the secret design
documents onto the USB key... )

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