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Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2007 18:29:30 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
Karl MacMillan <kmacmill@...hat.com>, viro@....linux.org.uk,
hch@...radead.org, Trond.Myklebust@...app.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> That sounds workable, although I think he will want a more specific hook
> than security_secctx_to_secid(), or possibly a second hook call, that
> would not only validate the context but authorize the use of it by the
> cachefilesd process. And then the security_task_kernel_act_as() hook
> just takes the secid as input rather than the task struct of the daemon,
> and applies it. At that point, nfsd can use the same mechanism for
> setting the acting SID based on the client process after doing its own
> authorization.
I thought using secids was verboten as it made things too specific.
Have you example code for the security hook you mention? I'm not sure I
understand why security_secctx_to_secid() is not sufficient.
Or is it that I need something that takes a secctx, converts it to a secid and
authorises its use all in one go? If it's this, why can't that be rolles into
security_task_kernel_act_as()? That sets up a task_security struct which is
then switched in and out without consultation of the LSM.
David
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