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Message-ID: <20071218003955.GA27048@sergelap.austin.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2007 18:39:55 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Containers <containers@...ts.osdl.org>
Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem.
Quoting Tetsuo Handa (penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp):
> Hello.
>
> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > CAP_MKNOD will be removed from its capability
> I think it is not enough because the root can rename/unlink device files
> (mv /dev/sda1 /dev/tmp; mv /dev/sda2 /dev/sda1; mv /dev/tmp /dev/sda2).
Sure but that doesn't bother us :)
The admin in the container has his own /dev directory and can do what he
likes with the devices he's allowed to have. He just shouldn't have
access to others. If he wants to rename /dev/sda1 to /dev/sda5 that's
his choice.
> > To use your approach, i guess we would have to use selinux (or tomoyo)
> > to enforce that devices may only be created under /dev?
> Everyone can use this filesystem alone.
Sure but it is worthless alone.
No?
What will keep the container admin from doing 'mknod /root/hda1 b 3 1'?
> But use with MAC (or whatever access control mechanisms that prevent
> attackers from unmounting/overlaying this filesystem) is recomennded.
-serge
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