linux-kernel - Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem.

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Message-ID: <20071218162228.79f75395@astralstorm.puszkin.org>
Date:	Tue, 18 Dec 2007 16:22:28 +0100
From:	Radoslaw Szkodzinski (AstralStorm) <lkml@...ralstorm.puszkin.org>
To:	Al Boldi <a1426z@...ab.com>
Cc:	"Indan Zupancic" <indan@....nu>,
	"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
	david@...idnewall.com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem.

On Mon, 17 Dec 2007 16:05:31 +0300
Al Boldi <a1426z@...ab.com> wrote:

> Indan Zupancic wrote:
> > On Mon, December 17, 2007 01:40, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > I think you can better spend your time on read-only bind mounts.
> 
> That would be too coarse.
> 

Actually, who needs to create device nodes? Just prohibit everyone from
creating them, except "installer" and "udev" personality.
This means removing CAP_MKNOD on a global scale.
(OTOH, both don't need CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Maybe udev needs
CAP_SYS_MODULE...)

Now, stopping people from faking hotplug events is totally another
story. Is that currently possible?

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