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Message-ID: <20071218162854.GN13486@halcrow.us>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2007 10:28:54 -0600
From: Michael Halcrow <mike@...crow.us>
To: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...ibm.com>,
Jarod Wilson <jwilson@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ecryptfs: fix string overflow on long cipher names
On Tue, Dec 18, 2007 at 09:51:15AM -0600, Eric Sandeen wrote:
> Passing a cipher name > 32 chars on mount results in an overflow
> when the cipher name is printed, because the last character
> in the struct ecryptfs_key_tfm's cipher_name string was never
> zeroed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...ibm.com>
I don't think this causes any issues outside of a couple of printk's
on error paths, but this should definitely go into the next -rc.
> ---
>
> Index: linux-2.6.24-rc3/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux-2.6.24-rc3.orig/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
> +++ linux-2.6.24-rc3/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
> @@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(struct ecryptfs
> mutex_init(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm_mutex);
> strncpy(tmp_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name,
> ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
> + tmp_tfm->cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE] = '\0';
> tmp_tfm->key_size = key_size;
> rc = ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm,
> tmp_tfm->cipher_name,
>
>
>
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