lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:	Fri, 21 Dec 2007 20:56:18 -0800
From:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To:	Eric Sandeen <sandeen@...hat.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...ibm.com>, mike@...crow.us,
	Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ecryptfs: check for existing key_tfm at mount time

On Thu, 20 Dec 2007 23:18:49 -0600 Eric Sandeen <sandeen@...hat.com> wrote:

> Jeff Moyer pointed out that a mount; umount loop of ecryptfs,
> with the same cipher & other mount options, created a new 
> ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache item each time, and the cache could
> grow quite large this way.
> 
> Looking at this with mhalcrow, we saw that ecryptfs_parse_options()
> unconditionally called ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(), which is what
> was adding these items.
> 
> Refactor ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name() to create a 
> new helper function, ecryptfs_tfm_exists(), which checks for the 
> cipher on the cached key_tfm_list, and sets a pointer
> to it if it exists.  This can then be called from 
> ecryptfs_parse_options(), and new key_tfm's can be added only when
> a cached one is not found.
> 

This change looks fishy.

> +/**
> + * ecryptfs_tfm_exists - Search for existing tfm for cipher_name.
> + * @cipher_name: the name of the cipher to search for
> + * @key_tfm: set to corresponding tfm if found
> + *
> + * Returns 1 if found, with key_tfm set
> + * Returns 0 if not found, key_tfm set to NULL
> + */
> +int ecryptfs_tfm_exists(char *cipher_name, struct ecryptfs_key_tfm **key_tfm)
> +{
> +	struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *tmp_key_tfm;
> +
> +	mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> +	list_for_each_entry(tmp_key_tfm, &key_tfm_list, key_tfm_list) {
> +		if (strcmp(tmp_key_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name) == 0) {
> +			mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> +			if (key_tfm)
> +				(*key_tfm) = tmp_key_tfm;

Here we return a pointer to an object without holding the lock and without
taking a refcount on it.  What prevents it from getting moved/freed/etc
while this thread of control is playing with it?

> +			return 1;
> +		}
> +	}
> +	mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> +	if (key_tfm)
> +		(*key_tfm) = NULL;
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  int ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(struct crypto_blkcipher **tfm,
>  					       struct mutex **tfm_mutex,
>  					       char *cipher_name)
> @@ -1877,22 +1904,15 @@ int ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_ciphe
>  
>  	(*tfm) = NULL;
>  	(*tfm_mutex) = NULL;
> -	mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> -	list_for_each_entry(key_tfm, &key_tfm_list, key_tfm_list) {
> -		if (strcmp(key_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name) == 0) {
> -			(*tfm) = key_tfm->key_tfm;
> -			(*tfm_mutex) = &key_tfm->key_tfm_mutex;
> -			mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> +
> +	if (!ecryptfs_tfm_exists(cipher_name, &key_tfm)) {

And given that we've just unlocked key_tfm_list_mutex, how do we know that
the return value from ecryptfs_tfm_exists() is still true in this window?


> +		rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(&key_tfm, cipher_name, 0);
> +		if (rc) {
> +			printk(KERN_ERR "Error adding new key_tfm to list; "
> +					"rc = [%d]\n", rc);
>  			goto out;
>  		}
>  	}
> -	mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);

It would all look a lot more solid if this locking was retained and both
ecryptfs_tfm_exists() and ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm() were designed to be
called under key_tfm_list_mutex.

> @@ -410,9 +410,11 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct
>  	if (!cipher_key_bytes_set) {
>  		mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = 0;
>  	}
> -	rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
> -		NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
> -		mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size);
> +	if (!ecryptfs_tfm_exists(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
> +				 NULL))
> +		rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
> +			NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
> +			mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size);

dittoes.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ