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Message-ID: <20080109230853.GA26627@sergelap.austin.rr.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2008 17:08:53 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: Indan Zupancic <indan@....nu>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
w@....eu, serue@...ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH][RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem.
Quoting Indan Zupancic (indan@....nu):
> Hello,
>
> On Wed, January 9, 2008 05:39, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > Hello.
> >
> > Indan Zupancic wrote:
> >> I think you focus too much on your way of enforcing filename/attributes
> >> pairs.
> > So?
>
> So that you miss alternatives and don't see the bigger picture.
These emails again are getting really long, but I think the gist of
Indan's suggestion can be concisely summarized:
"To confine process P3 to /dev/hda2 being 'b 3 2', create
/dev/p3, launch P3 in a new mounts namespace, mount --bind
/dev/p3 /dev, exec what you want p3 running, and have
MAC prevent umount /dev/p3."
This is a neat idea, but Tetsuo's rebutall is
"P3 may be legacy code needing to create or delete
/dev/floppy, where -EPERM confuses P3 and prevents
it working correctly."
Indan's idea is interesting and I like it, but is there an answer to
Tetsuo's problem with it?
thanks,
-serge
PS - Indan, you also said in essence "if P3 can be trusted to create
/dev/floppy why can't it be trusted to create /dev/hda1". I trust that,
phrased that way, the question answers itself?
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