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Message-Id: <1200409002.9669.43.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2008 09:56:42 -0500
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@...hat.com>, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM
settings for task actions [try #2]
On Mon, 2008-01-14 at 14:01 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>
> > > avc_has_perm(daemon_tsec->sid, nominated_sid,
> > > SECCLASS_CACHE, CACHE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, NULL);
> > >
> > > And I assume this doesn't care if one, the other or both of the two SIDs
> > > mentioned are of SECCLASS_PROCESS rather than of SECCLASS_CACHE.
> >
> > Right, the latter is reasonable.
>
> Okay... It looks like I want four security operations/hooks for cachefiles:
>
> (1) Check that a daemon can nominate a secid for use by the kernel to override
> the process subjective secid.
>
> (2) Set the secid mentioned in (1).
>
> (3) Check that the kernel may create files as a particular secid (this could
> be specified indirectly by specifying an inode, which would hide the secid
> inside the LSM).
I don't think this check is on the kernel per se but rather the ability
of the daemon to nominate a secid for use on files created later by the
kernel module.
> (4) Set the fscreate secid mentioned in (3).
>
> Now, it's possible to condense (1) and (2) into a single op, and condense (3)
> and (4) into a single op. That, however, might make the ops unusable by nfsd,
> which may well want to bypass the checks or do them elsewhere.
>
> Any thoughts?
I think it is fine to combine them.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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