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Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0802061650230.30955@jikos.suse.cz>
Date:	Wed, 6 Feb 2008 17:26:37 +0100 (CET)
From:	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
To:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
cc:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@...cle.com>,
	Hugh Dickins <hugh@...itas.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] Document randomize_va_space and CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK (was Re:
 [PATCH 2/2] ASLR: add possibility for more fine-grained tweaking)

On Wed, 6 Feb 2008, Ingo Molnar wrote:

> i've already added the patch below to x86.git.

OK, cool, thanks.

Still, I think that we want the Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt part of my 
patch probably. Updated patch below.


From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>

Document randomize_va_space and CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 8984a53..dc8801d 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - pid_max
 - powersave-nap               [ PPC only ]
 - printk
+- randomize_va_space
 - real-root-dev               ==> Documentation/initrd.txt
 - reboot-cmd                  [ SPARC only ]
 - rtsig-max
@@ -280,6 +281,34 @@ send before ratelimiting kicks in.
 
 ==============================================================
 
+randomize-va-space:
+
+This option can be used to select the type of process address
+space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures
+that support this feature.
+
+0 - Turn the process address space randomization off by default.
+
+1 - Make the addresses of mmap base, stack and VDSO page randomized.
+    This, among other things, implies that shared libraries will be
+    loaded to random addresses. Also for PIE-linked binaries, the location
+    of code start is randomized.
+
+    With heap randomization, the situation is a little bit more
+    complicated.
+    There a few legacy applications out there (such as some ancient
+    versions of libc.so.5 from 1996) that assume that brk area starts
+    just after the end of the code+bss. These applications break when
+    start of the brk area is randomized. There are however no known
+    non-legacy applications that would be broken this way, so for most
+    systems it is safe to choose full randomization. However there is
+    a CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK option for systems with ancient and/or broken
+    binaries, that makes heap non-randomized, but keeps all other
+    parts of process address space randomized if randomize_va_space
+    sysctl is turned on.
+
+==============================================================
+
 reboot-cmd: (Sparc only)
 
 ??? This seems to be a way to give an argument to the Sparc
--
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