[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0802061650230.30955@jikos.suse.cz>
Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2008 17:26:37 +0100 (CET)
From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@...cle.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hugh@...itas.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] Document randomize_va_space and CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK (was Re:
[PATCH 2/2] ASLR: add possibility for more fine-grained tweaking)
On Wed, 6 Feb 2008, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> i've already added the patch below to x86.git.
OK, cool, thanks.
Still, I think that we want the Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt part of my
patch probably. Updated patch below.
From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Document randomize_va_space and CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 8984a53..dc8801d 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
- pid_max
- powersave-nap [ PPC only ]
- printk
+- randomize_va_space
- real-root-dev ==> Documentation/initrd.txt
- reboot-cmd [ SPARC only ]
- rtsig-max
@@ -280,6 +281,34 @@ send before ratelimiting kicks in.
==============================================================
+randomize-va-space:
+
+This option can be used to select the type of process address
+space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures
+that support this feature.
+
+0 - Turn the process address space randomization off by default.
+
+1 - Make the addresses of mmap base, stack and VDSO page randomized.
+ This, among other things, implies that shared libraries will be
+ loaded to random addresses. Also for PIE-linked binaries, the location
+ of code start is randomized.
+
+ With heap randomization, the situation is a little bit more
+ complicated.
+ There a few legacy applications out there (such as some ancient
+ versions of libc.so.5 from 1996) that assume that brk area starts
+ just after the end of the code+bss. These applications break when
+ start of the brk area is randomized. There are however no known
+ non-legacy applications that would be broken this way, so for most
+ systems it is safe to choose full randomization. However there is
+ a CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK option for systems with ancient and/or broken
+ binaries, that makes heap non-randomized, but keeps all other
+ parts of process address space randomized if randomize_va_space
+ sysctl is turned on.
+
+==============================================================
+
reboot-cmd: (Sparc only)
??? This seems to be a way to give an argument to the Sparc
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists