[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <728865.70879.qm@web36611.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Date: Sun, 17 Feb 2008 21:17:25 -0800 (PST)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>, charles.kirsch@...ernet.lu
Cc: serue@...ibm.com, Andrew Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Gerald Combs <gerald@...eshark.org>,
Gilbert Ramirez <gram@...mni.rice.edu>,
Guy Harris <guy@...m.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Possible problem in linux file posix capabilities
--- "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com> wrote:
> ....
>
> Two quick fixes for you right now (apart from the one you've already
> got :) would be
>
> 1. give wireshark cap_kill, by doing something like
>
> capset cap_kill=ep /bin/wireshark
>
> 2. compile a kernel with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n
>
> Andrew, this pretty much was bound to happen... we need to figure out
> what our approach here should be. My preference is still to allow
> signals when p->uid==current->uid so long as !SECURE_NOROOT. Then as
> people start using secure_noroot process trees they at least must know
> what they're asking for.
>
> An alternative stance is to accept these things as they come up and try
> to quickly work with the authors of such programs to work around it. I
> suppose in a security sense that's the superior way :) But it also
> seems likely to lead to most people choosing option 2 above and not
> bothering to fix the problem.
I probably just missed it when it went by, but do you have some
test cases for file capabilities lying about that I might use?
Thank you.
Casey Schaufler
casey@...aufler-ca.com
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists