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Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2008 20:42:29 +0300
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...sign.ru>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
David Quigley <dpquigl@...ho.nsa.gov>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Harald Welte <laforge@...monks.org>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...nvz.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] security_task_kill: kill now unused "secid" argument
After the previous patch security_task_kill() is always called with secid == 0.
Remove this argument and simplify the ->task_kill() implementations.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...sign.ru>
include/linux/security.h | 13 +++++--------
kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 5 ++---
security/commoncap.c | 14 ++------------
security/dummy.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 ++----------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++++---------
7 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
--- 25/include/linux/security.h~3_STK_NO_SECID 2008-02-15 16:59:17.000000000 +0300
+++ 25/include/linux/security.h 2008-02-25 20:00:01.000000000 +0300
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struc
extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
+extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig);
extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
@@ -669,7 +669,6 @@ struct request_sock;
* @p contains the task_struct for process.
* @info contains the signal information.
* @sig contains the signal value.
- * @secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_wait:
* Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p
@@ -1342,7 +1341,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*task_getscheduler) (struct task_struct * p);
int (*task_movememory) (struct task_struct * p);
int (*task_kill) (struct task_struct * p,
- struct siginfo * info, int sig, u32 secid);
+ struct siginfo * info, int sig);
int (*task_wait) (struct task_struct * p);
int (*task_prctl) (int option, unsigned long arg2,
unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4,
@@ -1596,8 +1595,7 @@ int security_task_setscheduler(struct ta
int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p);
-int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid);
+int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig);
int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
@@ -2135,10 +2133,9 @@ static inline int security_task_movememo
}
static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
- struct siginfo *info, int sig,
- u32 secid)
+ struct siginfo *info, int sig)
{
- return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+ return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig);
}
static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
--- 25/kernel/signal.c~3_STK_NO_SECID 2008-02-25 19:13:56.000000000 +0300
+++ 25/kernel/signal.c 2008-02-25 20:01:07.000000000 +0300
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig
&& !capable(CAP_KILL))
return -EPERM;
- return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0);
+ return security_task_kill(t, info, sig);
}
/* forward decl */
--- 25/security/security.c~3_STK_NO_SECID 2008-02-15 16:59:20.000000000 +0300
+++ 25/security/security.c 2008-02-25 20:03:09.000000000 +0300
@@ -673,10 +673,9 @@ int security_task_movememory(struct task
return security_ops->task_movememory(p);
}
-int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
+int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
{
- return security_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+ return security_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
}
int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
--- 25/security/commoncap.c~3_STK_NO_SECID 2008-02-25 18:52:16.000000000 +0300
+++ 25/security/commoncap.c 2008-02-25 20:16:06.000000000 +0300
@@ -540,8 +540,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct
return cap_safe_nice(p);
}
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
+int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
{
/*
* Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
@@ -556,14 +555,6 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
return 0;
- if (secid)
- /*
- * Signal sent as a particular user.
- * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the
- * only thing we can do at the moment.
- * Used only by usb drivers?
- */
- return 0;
if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
return 0;
if (capable(CAP_KILL))
@@ -602,8 +593,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct
{
return 0;
}
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
+int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
{
return 0;
}
--- 25/security/dummy.c~3_STK_NO_SECID 2008-02-15 16:59:20.000000000 +0300
+++ 25/security/dummy.c 2008-02-25 20:08:47.000000000 +0300
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static int dummy_task_wait (struct task_
}
static int dummy_task_kill (struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
+ int sig)
{
return 0;
}
--- 25/security/smack/smack_lsm.c~3_STK_NO_SECID 2008-02-25 18:54:01.000000000 +0300
+++ 25/security/smack/smack_lsm.c 2008-02-25 20:10:08.000000000 +0300
@@ -1083,7 +1083,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct
* @p: the task object
* @info: unused
* @sig: unused
- * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
*
* Return 0 if write access is permitted
*
@@ -1091,20 +1090,13 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct
* in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
*/
static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
+ int sig)
{
/*
* Sending a signal requires that the sender
* can write the receiver.
*/
- if (secid == 0)
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
- /*
- * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
- * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
- * we can't take privilege into account.
- */
- return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
}
/**
--- 25/security/selinux/hooks.c~3_STK_NO_SECID 2008-02-25 18:57:23.000000000 +0300
+++ 25/security/selinux/hooks.c 2008-02-25 20:13:43.000000000 +0300
@@ -3184,13 +3184,12 @@ static int selinux_task_movememory(struc
}
static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
+ int sig)
{
u32 perm;
int rc;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3198,12 +3197,8 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task
perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
else
perm = signal_to_av(sig);
- tsec = p->security;
- if (secid)
- rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
- else
- rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
- return rc;
+
+ return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
}
static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
--
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