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Message-ID: <31708.65957.qm@web36611.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 08:33:34 -0800 (PST)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...ru>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM-ML <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -v7 -rc3] Security: Introduce security= boot parameter
--- "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com> wrote:
> Hi!,
>
> [
> Our usual changelog:
>
> - Fold the SMACK bugfix here cause now it depends on the
> new introduced security_ symbol.
> - Do not register smackfs if Smack was not loaded
> - Do not use a global to check if Smack was enabled, use
> security_module_enable(ops) instead.
> - Export smack_ops security operations to the rest of
> SMACK code to satisfy above point.
> - Remove James ACK cause patch semantics changed (could you
> please reACK ?).
> ]
>
> -->
>
> Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM
> registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module.
>
> User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no
> security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM
> asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security
> module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen.
>
> LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register
> by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux
> and SMACK to do so.
>
> Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on
> boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and
> the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done.
If the problem with initializing smackfs is because the
locks aren't initialized why not leave the lock initializations
in smack_init, and have them done before the check to see if the
smack LSM is going to get used? Really, we're only talking
about the case where a kernel is configured for testing or
development purposes, and the lock initialization can't
be considered a major impact in any case.
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@...il.com>
> Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...ru>
> ---
>
> Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++
> include/linux/security.h | 12 +++++++++
> security/dummy.c | 2 -
> security/security.c | 46
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 +++++
> security/smack/smack.h | 2 +
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++++-
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 9 ++++++-
>
> 8 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 9a5b665..64efbdc 100644
> --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -374,6 +374,12 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in
> the file
> possible to determine what the correct size should be.
> This option provides an override for these situations.
>
> + security= [SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot.
> + If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first
> + security module asking for security registration will be
> + loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated
> + as if no module has been chosen.
> +
> capability.disable=
> [SECURITY] Disable capabilities. This would normally
> be used only if an alternative security model is to be
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index fe52cde..801c9ad 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -42,6 +42,9 @@
>
> extern unsigned securebits;
>
> +/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
> +#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
> +
> struct ctl_table;
>
> /*
> @@ -117,6 +120,12 @@ struct request_sock;
> /**
> * struct security_operations - main security structure
> *
> + * Security module identifier.
> + *
> + * @name:
> + * A string that acts as a unique identifeir for the LSM with max number
> + * of characters = SECURITY_NAME_MAX.
> + *
> * Security hooks for program execution operations.
> *
> * @bprm_alloc_security:
> @@ -1207,6 +1216,8 @@ struct request_sock;
> * This is the main security structure.
> */
> struct security_operations {
> + char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
> +
> int (*ptrace) (struct task_struct * parent, struct task_struct * child);
> int (*capget) (struct task_struct * target,
> kernel_cap_t * effective,
> @@ -1466,6 +1477,7 @@ struct security_operations {
>
> /* prototypes */
> extern int security_init (void);
> +extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
> extern int register_security (struct security_operations *ops);
> extern int mod_reg_security (const char *name, struct security_operations
> *ops);
> extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode,
> diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
> index 649326b..96d196f 100644
> --- a/security/dummy.c
> +++ b/security/dummy.c
> @@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ static inline int dummy_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
>
> -struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
> +struct security_operations dummy_security_ops = { "dummy" };
>
> #define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \
> do { \
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d15e56c..f188672 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
>
> +/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
> +static spinlock_t chosen_lsm_lock;
> +static char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
>
> /* things that live in dummy.c */
> extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
> @@ -62,18 +65,59 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> }
>
> security_ops = &dummy_security_ops;
> + spin_lock_init(&chosen_lsm_lock);
> do_security_initcalls();
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/* Save user chosen LSM */
> +static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
> +{
> + strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("security=", choose_lsm);
> +
> +/**
> + * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
> + * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_operations that is to be checked.
> + *
> + * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations
> + * to avoid security registration races.
> + *
> + * Return true if:
> + * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
> + * -or user didsn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask
> + * for registeration permissoin.
> + * Otherwise, return false.
> + */
> +int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
> +{
> + int rc = 1;
> +
> + spin_lock(&chosen_lsm_lock);
> + if (!*chosen_lsm)
> + strncpy(chosen_lsm, ops->name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
> + else if (strncmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm, SECURITY_NAME_MAX))
> + rc = 0;
> + spin_unlock(&chosen_lsm_lock);
> +
> + if (rc)
> + printk(KERN_INFO "Security: Loading '%s' security module.\n",
> + ops->name);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel
> * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered
> *
> * This function is to allow a security module to register itself with the
> * kernel security subsystem. Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops
> - * value passed to this function.
> + * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM
> + * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops).
> *
> * If there is already a security module registered with the kernel,
> * an error will be returned. Otherwise 0 is returned on success.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 75c2e99..49709a4 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -5219,6 +5219,8 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> #endif
>
> static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
> + .name = "selinux",
> +
> .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
> .capget = selinux_capget,
> .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
> @@ -5405,6 +5407,11 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
> {
> struct task_security_struct *tsec;
>
> + if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
> + selinux_enabled = 0;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> if (!selinux_enabled) {
> printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
> index a21a0e9..c444f48 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack.h
> +++ b/security/smack/smack.h
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/capability.h>
> #include <linux/spinlock.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include <net/netlabel.h>
>
> /*
> @@ -195,6 +196,7 @@ extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
> extern struct smack_known smack_known_unset;
>
> extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
> +extern struct security_operations smack_ops;
>
> /*
> * Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation.
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 770eb06..afa7967 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -2433,7 +2433,9 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32
> seclen)
> {
> }
>
> -static struct security_operations smack_ops = {
> +struct security_operations smack_ops = {
> + .name = "smack",
> +
> .ptrace = smack_ptrace,
> .capget = cap_capget,
> .capset_check = cap_capset_check,
> @@ -2566,6 +2568,9 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ops = {
> */
> static __init int smack_init(void)
> {
> + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
> + return 0;
> +
> printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
>
> /*
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> index 358c92c..769da9a 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> @@ -986,12 +986,19 @@ static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount;
> *
> * register the smackfs
> *
> - * Returns 0 unless the registration fails.
> + * Do not register smackfs if Smack wasn't enabled
> + * on boot.
> + *
> + * Returns true if we were not chosen on boot or if
> + * we were chosen and filesystem registration succeeded.
> */
> static int __init init_smk_fs(void)
> {
> int err;
>
> + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
> + return 0;
> +
> err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type);
> if (!err) {
> smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type);
>
> --
>
> "Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
>
> Ahmed S. Darwish
> Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
> Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
>
>
>
Casey Schaufler
casey@...aufler-ca.com
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