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Message-ID: <4243.1205461820@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2008 02:30:20 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
kwc@...i.umich.edu, arunsr@....iitk.ac.in, dwalsh@...hat.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: Don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> hm, I didn't realise that the keys code had special knowlege of "root".
> How does that play alongside the containers stuff?
The containers stuff lacks a keys container. I'll have to attend to that at
some point.
The key code didn't so much have special knowledge of root, as UID 0 is
compiled into the kernel in various ways.
> would be more conventional.
>
> But better would be to teach alloc_uid() about kmem_cache_zalloc() then
> take a chainsaw to it.
Yeah, I was thinking that. That'd allow a slew of initialisations-to-zero to
be removed from that function, as indeed you have done in your attached patch.
> From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
>
> Use kmem_cache_zalloc(), remove large amounts of initialsiation code and
> ifdeffery.
"initialisation" perchance? :-)
> Note: this assumes that memset(*atomic_t, 0) correctly initialises the
> atomic_t. This is true for all present archtiectures and if it becomes false
> for a future architecture then we'll need to make large changes all over the
> place anyway.
>
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
David
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