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Message-Id: <E1Jck2N-0001Q3-7W@pomaz-ex.szeredi.hu>
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2008 17:24:11 +0100
From: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>
To: viro@...IV.linux.org.uk
CC: miklos@...redi.hu, haveblue@...ibm.com,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
neilb@...e.de, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, hch@...radead.org
Subject: Re: r-o bind in nfsd
> > I know there are a few cases, where filesystems call vfs_foo()
> > internally, where the vfsmount isn't available, but I think the proper
> > solution is just to fix those places, and not recurse back into the
> > VFS (which is AFAICS in all those cases totally unnecessary anyway).
> > This would make everybody happy, no?
>
> Apparmor can go play with itself. The proper fix is to lift the LSM nonsense
> into callers and leave vfs_...() alone;
Maybe. I know precious little about this security thing, so I won't
argue about it's merits or faults. But:
a) I have a hunch that the security guys wouldn't like to see the
order between permission() and security_foo() changed.
b) I fail to see how moving functionality to callers would improve
things
> vfsmounts should *not* be passed there at all, with the exception of
> vfs_follow_link() which gets the full nameidata.
Why?
Miklos
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