linux-kernel - Re: [TOMOYO #8 (2.6.25-mm1) 1/7] Introduce new LSM hooks.

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <200805080015.AHG26033.QOVMLOSFJHOFtF@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date:	Thu, 8 May 2008 00:15:56 +0900
From:	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To:	chrisw@...s-sol.org
Cc:	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, viro@...IV.linux.org.uk,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	haradats@...data.co.jp, takedakn@...data.co.jp
Subject: Re: [TOMOYO #8 (2.6.25-mm1) 1/7] Introduce new LSM hooks.

Hello.

Chris Wright wrote:

> * Toshiharu Harada (haradats@...data.co.jp) wrote:
> > This patch allows LSM to check permission using "struct vfsmount"
> > without passing "struct vfsmount" to VFS helper functions.
> 
> This is simply duplicating many of the existing checks.
> I don't see how this is an improvement.
> 
> > --- mm.orig/fs/namei.c
> > +++ mm/fs/namei.c
> > @@ -1595,6 +1595,9 @@ int vfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct
> >  	error = security_inode_create(dir, dentry, mode);
> >  	if (error)
> >  		return error;
> > +	error = security_path_create(dir, dentry, mode, nd);
> > +	if (error)
> > +		return error;
> 
> Pure duplication (of course adding nameidata, although I think you just
> want path).

Right. I should have added "path" parameter rather than adding a new hook.
But to avoid touching vfs_*(), I moved security_path_create() to
the callers of vfs_create().

> >  	DQUOT_INIT(dir);
> >  	error = dir->i_op->create(dir, dentry, mode, nd);
> >  	if (!error)
> > @@ -1650,6 +1653,17 @@ int may_open(struct nameidata *nd, int a
> 	...
> 	error = vfs_permission(nd, acc_mode);
> 	if (error)
> 		return error;
> 	...
> >  			return -EPERM;
> >  
> >  	/*
> > +	 * security_inode_permission() called from vfs_permission()
> > +	 * can't know that the file is going to be truncated when
> > +	 * open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_APPEND) is used.
> > +	 * So, this hook checks O_APPEND and O_TRUNC flags as well
> > +	 * as MAY_READ and MAY_WRITE flags.
> > +	 */
> > +	error = security_path_open(nd->path.dentry, nd->path.mnt, flag);
> > +	if (error)
> > +		return error;
> 
> Also duplication.  And why the unique flag handling, you don't seem to
> ever check?

Sorry. I didn't know security_dentry_open() is available.
Now, security_path_open() and security_path_uselib() have gone away.
But it also turned out that security_dentry_open() is too late for
checking open(O_CREAT) and open(O_TRUNC) cases. Thus, somehow,
I want to check O_CREAT before entering vfs_create() and
check O_TRUNC before entering do_truncate() from may_open().

Regards.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/