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Message-ID: <20080524080734.GV30402@sequoia.sous-sol.org>
Date: Sat, 24 May 2008 01:07:34 -0700
From: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
To: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
Dave Jones <davej@...emonkey.org.uk>,
Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
bojan@...ursive.com, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linux Security Modules List
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: capget() overflows buffers.
* Andrew G. Morgan (morgan@...nel.org) wrote:
> Your concern is for the situation when the garbage happens to correspond
> to an apparently meaningful setting for the upper capability bits? The
> problem being that this privileged application is more privileged than
> intended? I agree that this is not ideal.
Yep, exactly.
> In practice, however, this is only a real problem if named (or a
> similarly structured program) has a security related bug in it. No?
It's dropped privileges to help mitigate any security related bug it
may contain. It's conceivable (albeit remote[1]) that fork/exec plus
inheritable could leak privs w/out a security related bug.
> Is this your concern, or have I missed something?
That's it.
thanks,
-chris
[1] Get lucky combo in the garbage bits and have not shed uid 0.
Much less likely.
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