linux-kernel - Re: [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode

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Message-Id: <200805311948.HAD69220.tFOVHQOFSOFLJM@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date:	Sat, 31 May 2008 19:48:22 +0900
From:	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To:	hch@...radead.org
Cc:	miklos@...redi.hu, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
	sds@...ho.nsa.gov, eparis@...hat.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
	agruen@...e.de, jjohansen@...e.de, viro@...IV.linux.org.uk,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_create


Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 03:49:04PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...e.cz>
> > 
> > In the inode_create() security operation and related functions pass
> > the path (vfsmount + dentry) to the parent directory instead of the
> > inode.  AppArmor will need this.
> 
> So you're once again switching vfs_ to a pass a vfsmount argument, this
> time hidden under struct path.  It's really hard to grasp a "no"
> sometimes, isn't it? :)
> 
The vfs-cleanups git tree is developed for passing "vfsmount" argument so that
r/o bind mounts shall not fail to check "vfsmount" by reconstructing vfs_*() callers
and marking vfs_*() as "static".

If this vfs-cleanups git tree has no problem regarding "vfsmount" argument,
I think there is no advantage of adding security_path_*() hooks inside the path_*() functions
since everybody calls the vfs_*() functions via path_*() functions.

Passing "vfsmount" to vfs_*() functions is better for AppArmor and TOMOYO and auditing purpose
(we can obtain the absolute pathname compared to the relative pathname from the mount point) than
adding security_path_*(), isn't it?

Are you worrying that there might be a case where the "vfsmount" argument passed to
path_*() functions is invalid or NULL?
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