linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][Patch 5/5]integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20080531075425.GF5405@ucw.cz>
Date:	Sat, 31 May 2008 09:54:25 +0200
From:	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, safford@...son.ibm.com,
	serue@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, sailer@...son.ibm.com, zohar@...ibm.com,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	CaseySchaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][Patch 5/5]integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider

On Wed 2008-05-28 01:22:42, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Fri, 23 May 2008 11:05:45 -0400 Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > This is a re-release of Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA) as an
> > independent Linunx Integrity Module(LIM) service provider, which implements
> > the new LIM must_measure(), collect_measurement(), store_measurement(), and
> > display_template() API calls. The store_measurement() call supports two 
> > types of data, IMA (i.e. file data) and generic template data.
...
> Generally: the code is all moderately intrusive into the VFS and this
> sort of thing does need careful explanation and justification, please. 
> Once we have some understanding of what you're trying to achieve here
> we will inevitably ask "can't that be done in userspace".  So it would
> be best if your description were to preemptively answer all that.  

...also, it would be nice to see explanation 'what is this good for'.

Closest explanation I remember was 'it will protect you by making
system unbootable if someone stole disk with your /usr filesystem --
but not / filesystem -- added some rootkit, and then stealthily
returned it'. That seems a) very unlikely scenario and b) probably
better solved by encrypting /usr.
							Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/