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Message-ID: <9d732d950806020831h1b8aeabag9cb6db8e16bac971@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2008 00:31:14 +0900
From: "Toshiharu Harada" <haradats@...il.com>
To: "Evgeniy Polyakov" <johnpol@....mipt.ru>
Cc: "Miklos Szeredi" <miklos@...redi.hu>, hch@...radead.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
sds@...ho.nsa.gov, eparis@...hat.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
agruen@...e.de, jjohansen@...e.de,
penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_create
2008/6/3 Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@....mipt.ru>:
> On Mon, Jun 02, 2008 at 12:55:33PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi (miklos@...redi.hu) wrote:
>> Oh, I've been told. But valid technical reason given? No.
>
> This is a really interesting flame, can you proceed,
> we will run for cola and peanuts :)
Let me quote a message by Chris Wright from LSM ml:
"You cannot discover the path used to access an inode without knowing
both the dentry and the vfsmount objects. "
Another one by Stephen Smalley:
"Pathname-based security considered harmful. You want to control access
to an object, not a name, and the name-to-object mapping is neither
one-to-one nor immutable."
Can you guess when they were posted?
The answer is December 2003. :)
Do we need more time? I don't think so.
I'm viewing Miklos' patches as *enhancements* not only for AppArmor (and
other pathname-based LSM modules). Everyone can make use of
information and lose nothing. Am I too simple minded?
> For the technical reason: in case of stackable/bind, which path should
> be checked? Whatever answer is, there will always be another party,
> which wants different behaviour.
--
Toshiharu Harada
haradats@...il.com
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