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Message-ID: <20080603115801.GY28946@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2008 12:58:01 +0100
From: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...glemail.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@...reable.org>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>, drepper@...hat.com,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-man@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] utimensat() non-conformances and fixes [v3]
On Tue, Jun 03, 2008 at 12:49:21PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 03, 2008 at 01:39:07PM +0200, Michael Kerrisk wrote:
>
> > > Is there anything else where the file descriptor's access mode allows
> > > doing things on Linux, but the standard requires a permissions check
> > > each time?
> >
> > Jamie,
> >
> > I can't think of examples offhand -- but I'm also not quite sure what
> > your question is about. Could you say a little more?
>
> "Is anything else equally stupid?", I suspect... AFAICS, behaviour in
> question is inherited from futimes(2) in one of the *BSD - nothing to
> do about that now (at least 10 years too late). It's rather inconsistent
> with a lot of things, starting with "why utimes(2) has weaker requirements
> with NULL argument", but we are far too late to fix that.
PS: as far as I can reconstruct what had happened there, they've got
these checks buried directly in ufs_setattr() and its ilk, which worked
for utimes(2), but had bitten them when they tried to do descriptor-based
analog...
--
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