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Message-ID: <7c86c4470807020538o5732a575ladc1788e47f4011f@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 14:38:09 +0200
From: "stephane eranian" <eranian@...glemail.com>
To: "Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 17/19] perfmon2 minimal v3: system calls
Michael,
I will shortly be posting a description to LKML for the syscalls.
On Wed, Jul 2, 2008 at 1:04 PM, Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com> wrote:
> On 6/30/08, eranian@...glemail.com <eranian@...glemail.com> wrote:
>> This patch adds the top level perfmon2 system calls.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@...il.com>
>
> Stephane,
>
> Is their some documentation for these new system calls?
>
> Cheers,
>
> Michael
>
> ===================================================================
>> --- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
>> +++ linux-next/perfmon/perfmon_syscalls.c 2008-06-30 13:48:28.000000000 +0200
>> @@ -0,0 +1,719 @@
>> +/*
>> + * perfmon_syscalls.c: perfmon2 system call interface
>> + *
>> + * This file implements the perfmon2 interface which
>> + * provides access to the hardware performance counters
>> + * of the host processor.
>> + *
>> + * The initial version of perfmon.c was written by
>> + * Ganesh Venkitachalam, IBM Corp.
>> + *
>> + * Then it was modified for perfmon-1.x by Stephane Eranian and
>> + * David Mosberger, Hewlett Packard Co.
>> + *
>> + * Version Perfmon-2.x is a complete rewrite of perfmon-1.x
>> + * by Stephane Eranian, Hewlett Packard Co.
>> + *
>> + * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
>> + * Contributed by Stephane Eranian <eranian@....hp.com>
>> + * David Mosberger-Tang <davidm@....hp.com>
>> + *
>> + * More information about perfmon available at:
>> + * http://perfmon2.sf.net
>> + *
>> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
>> + * modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
>> + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
>> + *
>> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
>> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
>> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
>> + * General Public License for more details.
>> + *
>> + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
>> + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
>> + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA
>> + * 02111-1307 USA
>> + */
>> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
>> +#include <linux/fs.h>
>> +#include <linux/ptrace.h>
>> +#include <linux/perfmon_kern.h>
>> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
>> +#include "perfmon_priv.h"
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Context locking rules:
>> + * ---------------------
>> + * - any thread with access to the file descriptor of a context can
>> + * potentially issue perfmon calls
>> + *
>> + * - calls must be serialized to guarantee correctness
>> + *
>> + * - as soon as a context is attached to a thread or CPU, it may be
>> + * actively monitoring. On some architectures, such as IA-64, this
>> + * is true even though the pfm_start() call has not been made. This
>> + * comes from the fact that on some architectures, it is possible to
>> + * start/stop monitoring from userland.
>> + *
>> + * - If monitoring is active, then there can PMU interrupts. Because
>> + * context accesses must be serialized, the perfmon system calls
>> + * must mask interrupts as soon as the context is attached.
>> + *
>> + * - perfmon system calls that operate with the context unloaded cannot
>> + * assume it is actually unloaded when they are called. They first need
>> + * to check and for that they need interrupts masked. Then, if the
>> + * context is actually unloaded, they can unmask interrupts.
>> + *
>> + * - interrupt masking holds true for other internal perfmon functions as
>> + * well. Except for PMU interrupt handler because those interrupts
>> + * cannot be nested.
>> + *
>> + * - we mask ALL interrupts instead of just the PMU interrupt because we
>> + * also need to protect against timer interrupts which could trigger
>> + * a set switch.
>> + */
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * upper limit for count in calls that take vector arguments. This is used
>> + * to prevent for multiplication overflow when we compute actual storage size
>> + */
>> +#define PFM_MAX_ARG_COUNT(m) (INT_MAX/sizeof(*(m)))
>> +
>> +struct pfm_syscall_cookie {
>> + struct file *filp;
>> + int fput_needed;
>> +};
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * cannot attach if :
>> + * - kernel task
>> + * - task not owned by caller (checked by ptrace_may_attach())
>> + * - task is dead or zombie
>> + * - cannot use blocking notification when self-monitoring
>> + */
>> +static int pfm_task_incompatible(struct pfm_context *ctx,
>> + struct task_struct *task)
>> +{
>> + /*
>> + * cannot attach to a kernel thread
>> + */
>> + if (!task->mm) {
>> + PFM_DBG("cannot attach to kernel thread [%d]", task->pid);
>> + return -EPERM;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * cannot attach to a zombie task
>> + */
>> + if (task->exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE || task->exit_state == EXIT_DEAD) {
>> + PFM_DBG("cannot attach to zombie/dead task [%d]", task->pid);
>> + return -EBUSY;
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * pfm_get_task -- check permission and acquire task to monitor
>> + * @ctx: perfmon context
>> + * @pid: identification of the task to check
>> + * @task: upon return, a pointer to the task to monitor
>> + *
>> + * This function is used in per-thread mode only AND when not
>> + * self-monitoring. It finds the task to monitor and checks
>> + * that the caller has permissions to attach. It also checks
>> + * that the task is stopped via ptrace so that we can safely
>> + * modify its state.
>> + *
>> + * task refcount is incremented when succesful.
>> + */
>> +static int pfm_get_task(struct pfm_context *ctx, pid_t pid,
>> + struct task_struct **task)
>> +{
>> + struct task_struct *p;
>> + int ret = 0, ret1 = 0;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * When attaching to another thread we must ensure
>> + * that the thread is actually stopped. Just like with
>> + * perfmon system calls, we enforce that the thread
>> + * be ptraced and STOPPED by using ptrace_check_attach().
>> + *
>> + * As a consequence, only the ptracing parent can actually
>> + * attach a context to a thread. Obviously, this constraint
>> + * does not exist for self-monitoring threads.
>> + *
>> + * We use ptrace_may_attach() to check for permission.
>> + */
>> + read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
>> +
>> + p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
>> + if (p)
>> + get_task_struct(p);
>> +
>> + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
>> +
>> + if (!p) {
>> + PFM_DBG("task not found %d", pid);
>> + return -ESRCH;
>> + }
>> +
>> + ret = -EPERM;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * returns 0 if cannot attach
>> + */
>> + ret1 = ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
>> + if (ret1)
>> + ret = ptrace_check_attach(p, 0);
>> +
>> + PFM_DBG("may_attach=%d check_attach=%d", ret1, ret);
>> +
>> + if (ret || !ret1)
>> + goto error;
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_task_incompatible(ctx, p);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto error;
>> +
>> + *task = p;
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +error:
>> + if (!(ret1 || ret))
>> + ret = -EPERM;
>> +
>> + put_task_struct(p);
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * context must be locked when calling this function
>> + */
>> +int __pfm_check_task_state(struct pfm_context *ctx, int check_mask,
>> + unsigned long *flags)
>> +{
>> + struct task_struct *task;
>> + unsigned long local_flags, new_flags;
>> + int state, ret;
>> +
>> +recheck:
>> + /*
>> + * task is NULL for system-wide context
>> + */
>> + task = ctx->task;
>> + state = ctx->state;
>> + local_flags = *flags;
>> +
>> + PFM_DBG("state=%d check_mask=0x%x task=[%d]",
>> + state, check_mask, task ? task->pid:-1);
>> + /*
>> + * if the context is detached, then we do not touch
>> + * hardware, therefore there is not restriction on when we can
>> + * access it.
>> + */
>> + if (state == PFM_CTX_UNLOADED)
>> + return 0;
>> + /*
>> + * no command can operate on a zombie context.
>> + * A context becomes zombie when the file that identifies
>> + * it is closed while the context is still attached to the
>> + * thread it monitors.
>> + */
>> + if (state == PFM_CTX_ZOMBIE)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * at this point, state is PFM_CTX_LOADED
>> + */
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * some commands require the context to be unloaded to operate
>> + */
>> + if (check_mask & PFM_CMD_UNLOADED) {
>> + PFM_DBG("state=%d, cmd needs context unloaded", state);
>> + return -EBUSY;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * self-monitoring always ok.
>> + */
>> + if (task == current)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * at this point, monitoring another thread
>> + */
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * When we operate on another thread, we must wait for it to be
>> + * stopped and completely off any CPU as we need to access the
>> + * PMU state (or machine state).
>> + *
>> + * A thread can be put in the STOPPED state in various ways
>> + * including PTRACE_ATTACH, or when it receives a SIGSTOP signal.
>> + * We enforce that the thread must be ptraced, so it is stopped
>> + * AND it CANNOT wake up while we operate on it because this
>> + * would require an action from the ptracing parent which is the
>> + * thread that is calling this function.
>> + *
>> + * The dependency on ptrace, imposes that only the ptracing
>> + * parent can issue command on a thread. This is unfortunate
>> + * but we do not know of a better way of doing this.
>> + */
>> + if (check_mask & PFM_CMD_STOPPED) {
>> +
>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, local_flags);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * check that the thread is ptraced AND STOPPED
>> + */
>> + ret = ptrace_check_attach(task, 0);
>> +
>> + spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, new_flags);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * flags may be different than when we released the lock
>> + */
>> + *flags = new_flags;
>> +
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> + /*
>> + * we must recheck to verify if state has changed
>> + */
>> + if (unlikely(ctx->state != state)) {
>> + PFM_DBG("old_state=%d new_state=%d",
>> + state,
>> + ctx->state);
>> + goto recheck;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +int pfm_check_task_state(struct pfm_context *ctx, int check_mask,
>> + unsigned long *flags)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + ret = __pfm_check_task_state(ctx, check_mask, flags);
>> + PFM_DBG("ret=%d",ret);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * pfm_get_args - Function used to copy the syscall argument into kernel memory
>> + * @ureq: user argument
>> + * @sz: user argument size
>> + * @lsz: size of stack buffer
>> + * @laddr: stack buffer address
>> + * @req: point to start of kernel copy of the argument
>> + * @ptr_free: address of kernel copy to free
>> + *
>> + * There are two options:
>> + * - use a stack buffer described by laddr (addresses) and lsz (size)
>> + * - allocate memory
>> + *
>> + * return:
>> + * < 0 : in case of error (ptr_free may not be updated)
>> + * 0 : success
>> + * - req: points to base of kernel copy of arguments
>> + * - ptr_free: address of buffer to free by caller on exit.
>> + * NULL if using the stack buffer
>> + *
>> + * when ptr_free is not NULL upon return, the caller must kfree()
>> + */
>> +int pfm_get_args(void __user *ureq, size_t sz, size_t lsz, void *laddr,
>> + void **req, void **ptr_free)
>> +{
>> + void *addr;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * check syadmin argument limit
>> + */
>> + if (unlikely(sz > pfm_controls.arg_mem_max)) {
>> + PFM_DBG("argument too big %zu max=%zu",
>> + sz,
>> + pfm_controls.arg_mem_max);
>> + return -E2BIG;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * check if vector fits on stack buffer
>> + */
>> + if (sz > lsz) {
>> + addr = kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (unlikely(addr == NULL))
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + *ptr_free = addr;
>> + } else {
>> + addr = laddr;
>> + *req = laddr;
>> + *ptr_free = NULL;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * bring the data in
>> + */
>> + if (unlikely(copy_from_user(addr, ureq, sz))) {
>> + if (addr != laddr)
>> + kfree(addr);
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * base address of kernel buffer
>> + */
>> + *req = addr;
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * pfm_acquire_ctx_from_fd -- get ctx from file descriptor
>> + * @fd: file descriptor
>> + * @ctx: pointer to pointer of context updated on return
>> + * @cookie: opaque structure to use for release
>> + *
>> + * This helper function extracts the ctx from the file descriptor.
>> + * It also increments the refcount of the file structure. Thus
>> + * it updates the cookie so the refcount can be decreased when
>> + * leaving the perfmon syscall via pfm_release_ctx_from_fd
>> + */
>> +static int pfm_acquire_ctx_from_fd(int fd, struct pfm_context **ctx,
>> + struct pfm_syscall_cookie *cookie)
>> +{
>> + struct file *filp;
>> + int fput_needed;
>> +
>> + filp = fget_light(fd, &fput_needed);
>> + if (unlikely(filp == NULL)) {
>> + PFM_DBG("invalid fd %d", fd);
>> + return -EBADF;
>> + }
>> +
>> + *ctx = filp->private_data;
>> +
>> + if (unlikely(!*ctx || filp->f_op != &pfm_file_ops)) {
>> + PFM_DBG("fd %d not related to perfmon", fd);
>> + return -EBADF;
>> + }
>> + cookie->filp = filp;
>> + cookie->fput_needed = fput_needed;
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * pfm_release_ctx_from_fd -- decrease refcount of file associated with context
>> + * @cookie: the cookie structure initialized by pfm_acquire_ctx_from_fd
>> + */
>> +static inline void pfm_release_ctx_from_fd(struct pfm_syscall_cookie *cookie)
>> +{
>> + fput_light(cookie->filp, cookie->fput_needed);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * unlike the other perfmon system calls, this one returns a file descriptor
>> + * or a value < 0 in case of error, very much like open() or socket()
>> + */
>> +asmlinkage long sys_pfm_create_context(struct pfarg_ctx __user *ureq,
>> + char __user *fmt_name,
>> + void __user *fmt_uarg, size_t fmt_size)
>> +{
>> + struct pfarg_ctx req;
>> +
>> + PFM_DBG("req=%p fmt=%p fmt_arg=%p size=%zu",
>> + ureq, fmt_name, fmt_uarg, fmt_size);
>> +
>> + if (perfmon_disabled)
>> + return -ENOSYS;
>> +
>> + if (copy_from_user(&req, ureq, sizeof(req)))
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> + if (fmt_name || fmt_uarg || fmt_size)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + return __pfm_create_context(req.ctx_flags);
>> +}
>> +
>> +asmlinkage long sys_pfm_write_pmcs(int fd, struct pfarg_pmc __user *ureq,
>> + int count)
>> +{
>> + struct pfm_context *ctx;
>> + struct pfm_syscall_cookie cookie;
>> + struct pfarg_pmc pmcs[PFM_PMC_STK_ARG];
>> + struct pfarg_pmc *req;
>> + void *fptr;
>> + unsigned long flags;
>> + size_t sz;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + PFM_DBG("fd=%d req=%p count=%d", fd, ureq, count);
>> +
>> + if (count < 0 || count >= PFM_MAX_ARG_COUNT(ureq)) {
>> + PFM_DBG("invalid arg count %d", count);
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + }
>> +
>> + sz = count*sizeof(*ureq);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_acquire_ctx_from_fd(fd, &ctx, &cookie);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_get_args(ureq, sz, sizeof(pmcs), pmcs, (void **)&req, &fptr);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto error;
>> +
>> + spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_check_task_state(ctx, PFM_CMD_STOPPED, &flags);
>> + if (!ret)
>> + ret = __pfm_write_pmcs(ctx, req, count);
>> +
>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * This function may be on the critical path.
>> + * We want to avoid the branch if unecessary.
>> + */
>> + if (fptr)
>> + kfree(fptr);
>> +error:
>> + pfm_release_ctx_from_fd(&cookie);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +asmlinkage long sys_pfm_write_pmds(int fd, struct pfarg_pmd __user *ureq,
>> + int count)
>> +{
>> + struct pfm_context *ctx;
>> + struct pfm_syscall_cookie cookie;
>> + struct pfarg_pmd pmds[PFM_PMD_STK_ARG];
>> + struct pfarg_pmd *req;
>> + void *fptr;
>> + unsigned long flags;
>> + size_t sz;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + PFM_DBG("fd=%d req=%p count=%d", fd, ureq, count);
>> +
>> + if (count < 0 || count >= PFM_MAX_ARG_COUNT(ureq)) {
>> + PFM_DBG("invalid arg count %d", count);
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + }
>> +
>> + sz = count*sizeof(*ureq);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_acquire_ctx_from_fd(fd, &ctx, &cookie);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_get_args(ureq, sz, sizeof(pmds), pmds, (void **)&req, &fptr);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto error;
>> +
>> + spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_check_task_state(ctx, PFM_CMD_STOPPED, &flags);
>> + if (!ret)
>> + ret = __pfm_write_pmds(ctx, req, count);
>> +
>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + if (fptr)
>> + kfree(fptr);
>> +error:
>> + pfm_release_ctx_from_fd(&cookie);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +asmlinkage long sys_pfm_read_pmds(int fd, struct pfarg_pmd __user *ureq,
>> + int count)
>> +{
>> + struct pfm_context *ctx;
>> + struct pfm_syscall_cookie cookie;
>> + struct pfarg_pmd pmds[PFM_PMD_STK_ARG];
>> + struct pfarg_pmd *req;
>> + void *fptr;
>> + unsigned long flags;
>> + size_t sz;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + PFM_DBG("fd=%d req=%p count=%d", fd, ureq, count);
>> +
>> + if (count < 0 || count >= PFM_MAX_ARG_COUNT(ureq))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + sz = count*sizeof(*ureq);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_acquire_ctx_from_fd(fd, &ctx, &cookie);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_get_args(ureq, sz, sizeof(pmds), pmds, (void **)&req, &fptr);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto error;
>> +
>> + spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_check_task_state(ctx, PFM_CMD_STOPPED, &flags);
>> + if (!ret)
>> + ret = __pfm_read_pmds(ctx, req, count);
>> +
>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + if (copy_to_user(ureq, req, sz))
>> + ret = -EFAULT;
>> +
>> + if (fptr)
>> + kfree(fptr);
>> +error:
>> + pfm_release_ctx_from_fd(&cookie);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +asmlinkage long sys_pfm_stop(int fd)
>> +{
>> + struct pfm_context *ctx;
>> + struct pfm_syscall_cookie cookie;
>> + unsigned long flags;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + PFM_DBG("fd=%d", fd);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_acquire_ctx_from_fd(fd, &ctx, &cookie);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_check_task_state(ctx, PFM_CMD_STOPPED, &flags);
>> + if (!ret)
>> + ret = __pfm_stop(ctx);
>> +
>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + pfm_release_ctx_from_fd(&cookie);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +asmlinkage long sys_pfm_start(int fd)
>> +{
>> + struct pfm_context *ctx;
>> + struct pfm_syscall_cookie cookie;
>> + unsigned long flags;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + PFM_DBG("fd=%d", fd);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_acquire_ctx_from_fd(fd, &ctx, &cookie);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_check_task_state(ctx, PFM_CMD_STOPPED, &flags);
>> + if (!ret)
>> + ret = __pfm_start(ctx);
>> +
>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + pfm_release_ctx_from_fd(&cookie);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +asmlinkage long sys_pfm_load_context(int fd, struct pfarg_load __user *ureq)
>> +{
>> + struct pfarg_load req;
>> + struct pfm_context *ctx;
>> + struct task_struct *task;
>> + struct pfm_syscall_cookie cookie;
>> + unsigned long flags;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + PFM_DBG("fd=%d ureq=%p", fd, ureq);
>> +
>> + if (copy_from_user(&req, ureq, sizeof(req)))
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_acquire_ctx_from_fd(fd, &ctx, &cookie);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + task = current;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * in per-thread mode (not self-monitoring), get a reference
>> + * on task to monitor. This must be done with interrupts enabled
>> + * Upon succesful return, refcount on task is increased.
>> + *
>> + * fget_light() is protecting the context.
>> + */
>> + if (req.load_pid != current->pid) {
>> + ret = pfm_get_task(ctx, req.load_pid, &task);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto error;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * irqsave is required to avoid race in case context is already
>> + * loaded or with switch timeout in the case of self-monitoring
>> + */
>> + spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_check_task_state(ctx, PFM_CMD_UNLOADED, &flags);
>> + if (!ret)
>> + ret = __pfm_load_context(ctx, task);
>> +
>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * in per-thread mode (not self-monitoring), we need
>> + * to decrease refcount on task to monitor:
>> + * - load successful: we have a reference to the task in ctx->task
>> + * - load failed : undo the effect of pfm_get_task()
>> + */
>> + if (task != current)
>> + put_task_struct(task);
>> +error:
>> + pfm_release_ctx_from_fd(&cookie);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +asmlinkage long sys_pfm_unload_context(int fd)
>> +{
>> + struct pfm_context *ctx;
>> + struct pfm_syscall_cookie cookie;
>> + unsigned long flags;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + PFM_DBG("fd=%d", fd);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_acquire_ctx_from_fd(fd, &ctx, &cookie);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + ret = pfm_check_task_state(ctx, PFM_CMD_STOPPED|PFM_CMD_UNLOAD,
>> + &flags);
>> + if (!ret)
>> + ret = __pfm_unload_context(ctx);
>> +
>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * if unload was successful, then release the session
>> + * must be called with interrupts enabled, thus we need
>> + * to defer until are out of __pfm_unload_context()
>> + */
>> + if (!ret)
>> + pfm_session_release();
>> +
>> + pfm_release_ctx_from_fd(&cookie);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> Index: linux-next/include/linux/perfmon.h
>> ===================================================================
>> --- linux-next.orig/include/linux/perfmon.h 2008-06-26 20:06:58.000000000 +0200
>> +++ linux-next/include/linux/perfmon.h 2008-06-30 13:48:29.000000000 +0200
>> @@ -46,6 +46,16 @@
>> #define PFM_PMC_BV PFM_BVSIZE(PFM_MAX_PMCS)
>>
>> /*
>> + * argument to pfm_create_context() system call
>> + * structure shared with user level
>> + */
>> +struct pfarg_ctx {
>> + __u32 ctx_flags; /* context flags */
>> + __u32 ctx_reserved1; /* for future use */
>> + __u64 ctx_reserved2[7]; /* for future use */
>> +};
>> +
>> +/*
>> * argument to pfm_write_pmcs() system call.
>> * structure shared with user level
>> */
>> @@ -70,6 +80,17 @@
>> };
>>
>> /*
>> + * argument to pfm_load_context() system call.
>> + * structure shared with user level
>> + */
>> +struct pfarg_load {
>> + __u32 load_pid; /* thread or CPU to attach to */
>> + __u16 load_reserved0; /* for future use */
>> + __u16 load_reserved1; /* for future use */
>> + __u64 load_reserved2[3]; /* for future use */
>> +};
>> +
>> +/*
>> * default value for the user and group security parameters in
>> * /proc/sys/kernel/perfmon/sys_group
>> * /proc/sys/kernel/perfmon/task_group
>> Index: linux-next/kernel/sys_ni.c
>> ===================================================================
>> --- linux-next.orig/kernel/sys_ni.c 2008-06-26 17:46:28.000000000 +0200
>> +++ linux-next/kernel/sys_ni.c 2008-06-26 20:07:41.000000000 +0200
>> @@ -161,3 +161,13 @@
>> cond_syscall(compat_sys_timerfd_settime);
>> cond_syscall(compat_sys_timerfd_gettime);
>> cond_syscall(sys_eventfd);
>> +
>> +/* perfmon */
>> +cond_syscall(sys_pfm_create_context);
>> +cond_syscall(sys_pfm_write_pmcs);
>> +cond_syscall(sys_pfm_write_pmds);
>> +cond_syscall(sys_pfm_read_pmds);
>> +cond_syscall(sys_pfm_start);
>> +cond_syscall(sys_pfm_stop);
>> +cond_syscall(sys_pfm_load_context);
>> +cond_syscall(sys_pfm_unload_context);
>> Index: linux-next/perfmon/Makefile
>> ===================================================================
>> --- linux-next.orig/perfmon/Makefile 2008-06-26 20:07:01.000000000 +0200
>> +++ linux-next/perfmon/Makefile 2008-06-30 13:48:28.000000000 +0200
>> @@ -7,4 +7,5 @@
>> perfmon_init.o perfmon_ctxsw.o \
>> perfmon_intr.o perfmon_pmu.o \
>> perfmon_sysfs.o perfmon_rw.o \
>> - perfmon_activate.o perfmon_attach.o
>> + perfmon_activate.o perfmon_attach.o \
>> + perfmon_syscalls.o
>>
>> --
>>
>>
>> --
>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
>> the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
>> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>> Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
>>
>
>
> --
> Michael Kerrisk
> Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
> Found a bug? http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/reporting_bugs.html
>
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