linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] x86: Optimize tail handling for copy

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Message-ID: <m3ljzj60mk.fsf@gravicappa.englab.brq.redhat.com>
Date:	Wed, 30 Jul 2008 14:02:27 +0200
From:	Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@...il.com>
To:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@...il.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Optimize tail handling for copy_user

Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> writes:

> On Mon, 28 Jul 2008, Vitaly Mayatskikh wrote:
>>
>> Reduce protection faults count in copy_user_handle_tail routine by
>> limiting clear length to the end of page as was suggested by Linus.
>
> No, you did it wrong.

Another try. Added direction and clear remainder flags to let
handle tail routine know how to optimize tail copying and clearing.
BYTES_LEFT_IN_PAGE macro returns PAGE_SIZE, not zero, when the address
is well aligned to page.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@...il.com>

diff --git a/include/asm-x86/uaccess_64.h b/include/asm-x86/uaccess_64.h
index 5cfd295..e0ddedf 100644
--- a/include/asm-x86/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/include/asm-x86/uaccess_64.h
@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
 #ifndef ASM_X86__UACCESS_64_H
 #define ASM_X86__UACCESS_64_H
 
+/* Flags for copy_user_handle_tail */
+#define CLEAR_REMAINDER		1
+#define DEST_IS_USERSPACE	2
+#define SOURCE_IS_USERSPACE	4
+
+#define BYTES_LEFT_IN_PAGE(ptr) \
+	(unsigned)((PAGE_MASK & ((long)(ptr) + PAGE_SIZE)) - (long)(ptr))
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
 /*
  * User space memory access functions
  */
@@ -179,23 +189,26 @@ __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned size)
 }
 
 extern long __copy_user_nocache(void *dst, const void __user *src,
-				unsigned size, int zerorest);
+				unsigned size, unsigned flags);
 
 static inline int __copy_from_user_nocache(void *dst, const void __user *src,
 					   unsigned size)
 {
 	might_sleep();
-	return __copy_user_nocache(dst, src, size, 1);
+	return __copy_user_nocache(dst, src, size, SOURCE_IS_USERSPACE
+						   | CLEAR_REMAINDER);
 }
 
 static inline int __copy_from_user_inatomic_nocache(void *dst,
 						    const void __user *src,
 						    unsigned size)
 {
-	return __copy_user_nocache(dst, src, size, 0);
+	return __copy_user_nocache(dst, src, size, SOURCE_IS_USERSPACE);
 }
 
 unsigned long
-copy_user_handle_tail(char *to, char *from, unsigned len, unsigned zerorest);
+copy_user_handle_tail(char *dst, char *src, unsigned remainder, unsigned flags);
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* ASM_X86__UACCESS_64_H */

-- 
wbr, Vitaly
--
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