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Message-ID: <20080805173208.GA8380@ucw.cz>
Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2008 19:32:09 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@...e.cz>
To: david safford <safford@...son.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, serue@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
sailer@...son.ibm.com, zohar@...ibm.com,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
CaseySchaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][Patch 5/5]integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider
On Tue 2008-06-24 12:28:50, david safford wrote:
> On Wed, 2008-05-28 at 01:22 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
>
> > - I see lots of user file I/O being done from within the kernel.
> > This makes eyebrows raise. Also some other eyebrow-raising
> > file-related things in there.
> >
> > Generally: the code is all moderately intrusive into the VFS and this
> > sort of thing does need careful explanation and justification, please.
> > Once we have some understanding of what you're trying to achieve here
> > we will inevitably ask "can't that be done in userspace". So it would
> > be best if your description were to preemptively answer all that.
> >
> >
> Sorry about this delayed response - we are about to repost for RFC, and
> noticed we missed responding to this.
>
> The Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires that all files be measured,
> (hashed) and the measurement committed to the hardware TPM before any
> data of the file is accessed in any way. In addition, if the measurement
> is incorrect, all access to the file must be denied.
TPM model may require this, but what is the benefit to the user/owner
of the machine?
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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