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Message-ID: <20080811195645.GA16685@us.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2008 14:56:45 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>
Cc: serue@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@...cle.com>, safford@...son.ibm.com,
sailer@...son.ibm.com, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] integrity: Linux Integrity Module(LIM)
Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@...ibm.com):
> serue@...ux.vnet.ibm.com wrote on 08/11/2008 01:02:55 PM:
>
> > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@...ibm.com):
> > > Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org> wrote on 08/09/2008 02:53:40 PM:
> > > > > int vfs_permission(struct nameidata *nd, int mask)
> > > > > {
> > > > > - return inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode, mask);
> > > > > + int retval;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + retval = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode, mask);
> > > > > + if (retval)
> > > > > + return retval;
> > > > > + return integrity_inode_permission(NULL, &nd->path,
> > > > > + mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE |
> > > > > + MAY_EXEC));
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > /**
> > > > > @@ -306,7 +314,14 @@ int vfs_permission(struct nameidata *nd,
> > > > > */
> > > > > int file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
> > > > > {
> > > > > - return inode_permission(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode, mask);
> > > > > + int retval;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + retval = inode_permission(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode, mask);
> > > > > + if (retval)
> > > > > + return retval;
> > > > > + return integrity_inode_permission(file, NULL,
> > > > > + mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE |
> > > > > + MAY_EXEC));
> > > >
> > > > Please put your hook into inode_permission. Note that in inode
> > > > permission and lots of callers there is no path available so don't
> pass
> > > > it. Please pass the full MAY_FOO mask for new interfaces and do
> > > > filtering that won't break if new ones are introduced.
> > >
> > > We started out with the integrity_inode_permission() hook call in
> > > inode_permission(), but because of the removal of the nameidata
> > > parameter in the last merge, based on discussions
> > > http://marc.info/?l=linux-security-module&m=121797845308246&w=2,
> > > the call to integrity_inode_permission() was moved up to the caller,
> > > where either a file or path are available. Any suggestions?
> >
> > Mimi, can you explain exactly (and concisely) what you are doing with
> > the pathname?
>
> IMA maintains a list of hash values of system sensitive files loaded
> into the run-time of the system and extends a PCR with the hash value.
> In order to calculate this hash value, IMA requires access to either
> the file or the path, which currently is not accessible in
> inode_permission().
So the usual question is, if I've done
ln -s /etc/shadow /tmp/shadow
will IMA do the right thing if I'm opening /tmp/shadow? Or will it only
catch any writes I've done the next time someone (i.e. passwd) opens
/etc/shadow?
thanks,
-serge
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